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ABSTRACT
If the purpose of this thesis is to offer new insight 
into the political thought of Relnhold Niebuhr, it will be seen 
that the analysis must proceed in three stages. Initially, 
the problem will be to establish in theory some scheme by which 
meaning can, in some degree, be brought to all political sys­
tems, and through which certain fundamental characteristics, 
found in some systems but not in others, may be permitted to 
emerge. This will involve the setting up of two extreme posi­
tions. The second problem will entail of course, clarifying 
exactly what Relnhold Niebuhr’s political thought is. Coinci­
dent with, although logically distinguishable from, this, is 
the third problem —  the task of applying the established 
scheme to that particular political thought.
The two extreme positions will be called Political 
Realism and Political Idealism, both of which are common terms 
in political parlance. Unfortunately however, it is the case 
that neither of these concepts is susceptible to clear and 
brief definition, and as such, neither has heretofore been ca­
pable of anything mora than roughly indicating general predis­
positions, and at times, fitting the biases of the person that 
wields them. Accordingly, it will be necessary to ground both 
these labels in terms which neither equivocate nor beg the 
question.
iii
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But while dealing with what are admittedly two "ideal” 
types, it must be kept in mind that to demonstrate relevance 
in any particular case, is not to prove thereby that this 
scheme has the final word* Insofar as it is the purpose of 
this thesis to explain Niebuhr in these terms, it will be ar­
gued that to understand Niebuhr’s thought is to be aware of 
the way in which he combines elements of both schools. But 
Insofar as a proper perspective of the truth inhering in one's 
own cause must be maintained, it will be observed, even if it 
is only as an aside, that Niebuhr cannot ultimately be con­
tained by the terms of this categorisation*
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FBEFACI
The French, It is said, and especially French academics, 
have a genius for complex order# That is to say, they seem to 
take a positive delight in making a theoretical muchness out 
of any simple assertion, and verge on ecstasy before the pros­
pect of working an intricate balance and form into the pres­
entation of that simple assertion. They pale visibly at the 
mention of what is generally known as muddled English pragma­
tism, and certainly, if the Germans gave birth to the dialectic, 
the French adopted it and raised it as their own. Anyone who 
has had the opportunity of sitting an exam composed by a native- 
born French scholar will testify to the necessity of approach­
ing every problem In the following maimer* 1 ) place the state­
ment, question, or problem In its historical context or back­
ground! 2 ) state the thesisf 3) state the antithesis! and 
*+) state the synthesis# Of course the pattern may vary in its 
richness occasionally —  the reasoning being that if one dia­
lectical progression is good, two are better. Thus from time 
to time one may be called upon to state the thesis and anti­
thesis of the original thesis and antithesis.
All this is understandably confusing to the "English" 
mind, whatever that is, and may require a brief explanation. 
Without doubt, this singular obsession with complex order is 
due as much to a demand on the part of the "French" mind for
v
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both Intellectual rigour and esthetic appeal in the presenta­
tion of an idea, as it is to the fact that the academic world 
in general is universally renowned for the absence of a sense 
of the ridiculous. Moreover, it is a commonly held assumption 
among both academics and Frenchmen that effective thought 
{not to say thesis-writing) consists in the art of imposing a 
credible order on ordinary reality, thereby eliciting some 
perception of an order in reality. These are things one learns 
to live with.
But what has all this to do with a preface to a thesis 
ostensibly concerned with political science? The reader may 
very well ask. It is clear even to the author that the con­
nection between the following presentation of the political 
thought of Reinhold Niebuhr and the folkways of an entire na­
tion, not to mention those of a minority group, are tenuous at 
best. Yet what other purpose can a preface serve than that it 
prepare the reader for what is to follow? Thus the reader is 
hereby advised that the author received his undergraduate 
training at the hands of a group of emigre French scholars| 
that their handiwork has only too well borne fruit5 that the 
above-outlined scheme has been assiduously followed in the 
body of this thesis 5 and that a synthesis has been wrought be­
tween an undergraduate thesis written in (in, to, and 
about the French genius) and a master’s thesis written in 1966. 
This is surely the first instance on record of a synthesis of 
two theses.
vl
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CHAPTER I
POLITICAL IDEALISM fS POLITICAL REALISM
The reasonable man adapts himself to the 
world* the unreasonable one persists in trying 
to adapt the world to himself. Therefore all 
progress depends on the unreasonable man.
SHAW, Maxima for. Revolutionists. page 233.
Classification is the refuge of the sluggish mind.
It is a pedagogic device that has only one end in mind - that 
of the facilitation of learning through simplification, which 
In turn means the pursuit of essentials and the discarding of 
the superfluous. This of course necessitates choice* All 
rational thought Inherently involves this process of systema­
tization, and Indeed for that thought to be communicable to 
others in terms of logic, it must do so. Both student and 
teacher are forced to search for Order in a Universe which 
will remain unmoved by any human attempts to subject it to 
such a restriction.
The most readily comprehensible classification is that 
of the simple thesis and antithesis. Grouping all phenomena 
with reference to their opposites, positive and negative, is 
the ultimate in Intellectual neatness and has found no more 
Inspired a champion than the American philosopher William James.
1
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As S.H. Carr observes,1 beside such a system of paired oppo­
sites as Rationalist-Empirlcist, Intellectual!st-Sensation- 
alist, Idealist-Materialist, Qptimist-Pessimist, Religious- 
Irreligious, Monist-Pluralist, Voluntarist-Fatalist, and Dog- 
matist-Sceptic, even Hegel's triadic dialectic must appear 
heavily encumbered and awkward. Moreover, apart from mundane 
considerations of comprehensibility, the esthetic appeal of 
such pure artistic form cannot be gainsaid. It is unfortunate 
that while two points do make a straight line (or a comparison), 
it however takes a third point to give it meaning*
Having thus made all the proper academic reservations 
pertaining to the artificial and subjective nature of "classi­
fication" par se, it is now permissible to proceed directly to 
the purpose of this introductory chapter, which is: to define 
that basic distinction between Realism and Idealism which in­
forms all differing political systems, and in the process, to 
ascertain in vhat way this distinction diverges, if indeed it 
does, from others offered to a similar end.
Such traditional constrasts as democratic vs. aristo­
cratic, individualistic vs. oollectlvistic, or liberal vs. 
conservative are by now quit© familiar if for no other reason 
than that each in a modified but recognisable form, has en­
joyed its brief moment on the stage of history. At such pe­
riods each theory reflected the power ambitions of particular 
social groupings or classes and each articulated a specific
*42.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis. New York, 196^ -,
p .1 2 .
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3concept of the nature of man and his relations to the community. 
And in turn each claimed to Justify itself in terms of such 
equally vague concepts as MJustice*', "liberty", "equality", "or­
der", "good government" or "pursuit of happiness".
Whether one attempts to distinguish between political 
theories on the basis of these aforementioned ultimata Justi­
fications, or for instance, merely on one particular aspect 
of the "exercise of authority", will depend In the final anal­
ysis on the degree to which the observer wishes to be 'purely' 
or 'exclusively* political. If politics is the "master science" 
it is because the study of a political system may take one of 
many divers# courses suitable to the respective talents of the 
philosopher and the economist, or the theologian and the soci­
ologist, and still b® legitimately considered a political study. 
It is possible, however, to be uniquely political In a narrower 
sense by confining the examination to the exercise of power, 
the consideration of which belongs less properly to any other 
field. By using such a narrow criterion, it is thus possible 
to distinguish between political theories on a 'purely' po­
litical ground, but there is no Inherent reason why using such 
an 'exclusively' political criterion should be preferable to 
any other.
Just as no single view of distinguishing and classi­
fying political systems can be considered superior to all 
others by virtue of its "political-ness", so no on® criterion 
can be held to fill the role of "all-inclusive distinction"
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
better than all others. This warning cannot be emphasized too 
strongly. While most antithetical categories may be of great 
use in examining many theories of politics from a particular 
point of view, it must be seriously questioned whether these 
same distinctions can be anything more than equally artificial 
and arbitrary when applied to the whole of political thought. 
It will be seen that exactly how useful any given scheme is, 
depends on one's purposes. Hopefully this criterion of con­
scious aim will be applied to the one upon which this thesis 
is built.
Taken as a whole, no political theory can be said to 
be "true". It contains among its component parts certain 
Judgments of fact, estimates of probability, concepts of the 
'good1, the 'real', the 'rational', and ways of knowing them. 
While these elements, in combination, may be Judged "logically 
consistent" in their mutual interrelation and while they may 
be deemed to provide "useful insights" into political phenom­
ena, invariably they Include evaluations and preferences which 
will distort the perception of fact, will shape the estimates 
of probability, and will determine the aforementioned concepts 
Similarly, there exist no independent criteria for demonstra­
ting that any political theory is "false", either in its whole 
or in its parts. Despite this, there exists a distinction 
between fact and value whieh theoretically stands to be ap­
plied to all thought. It is precisely when this application 
is attempted, that the relationship between the two becomes 
less clearly defined than the contrast in theory would make
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5
it appear. It Is not that the meaning of the two concepts is 
ambiguous in their mutual tension, but simply that any asser­
tion involving their use begs a prior question of the nature 
of reality and knowledge.
Positing then In theory, two worlds —  the empirical 
world of fact and the ideal world of 'rational* value —  the 
basic question concerns the relationship between the two. Any 
statement on this relationship betrays a prior ontologieal 
and eplstemological commitment whether it is claimed that in 
'reality' the distinction ceases to exist or otherwise. No 
political theorist can escape the responsibility of making a 
judgment explicitly or Implicitly on this relationship, al­
though admittedly a mere statistician of contemporary political 
behaviour may limit the extent of such judgments to fundamental 
methodology. This fact alone suggests that It is possible to 
make an extended classification of all political systems in 
terms of these judgments.
Apart from whether it is or is not possible to make 
such a distinction, the overriding concern must involve the 
value of doing so. It would not be difficult to devise any 
number of dividing lines whose sole merit would consist in the 
fact that they cover the entire length of political thought, 
were it not necessary to demonstrate as well that the result 
is fruitful in terms of academic inquiry. While grouping all 
political theorists according to whether they reasoned induc­
tively or deductively might have relevance to an historic de­
bate over conceptual framework, sine® no consistent relation­
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ship can fee established between 'method' and any other uni­
versal criterion, the research would ultimately be found to 
be sterile. For example, Plato, Rousseau, and Hobbes used a 
deductive method In constructing their theories while Aristotle ‘ 
and Machiavelli employed inductive procedures and John Stuart 
Mill combined both. It is thus necessary to demonstrate that 
any distinction in general, and in particular, the one herein 
presented which is based on differing concepts of the rela­
tionship In history between the empirical world and the ra­
tional ideal, reveals fundamental antagonisms which may never 
be resolved, and explains predispositions in issues of the 
highest importance.2 The extent to which these requirements 
are met may be better judged when the criteria are explained 
in detail.
Derived from this original distinction between fact 
and value, this "dividing-line" to be herein presented, may 
be summed up in differing concepts of the "possible". Herein 
two broad schools of thought emerge. The labels which will be 
used for these schools are .Realism and Idealism, although the 
reader is advised that the meanings which will be assigned to
2l’he word 1 predispositions' is used her© for want of 
any better objective term. Admittedly one could go overboard 
in this objectivity in the manner of Bertrand Russell who is 
reported as saying during the last war, that he personally had 
no quarrel with Hitler's philosophy although he objected to it 
on purely esthetic grounds* The 'issues of the highest im­
portance' refers not to debates over which type of government 
produces what type of system, but to such arguments over hier­
archies of values such as whether Order or Freedom or Justice 
should be the conscious end of political action*
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these words may not conform fully to accepted usage, nor nec­
essarily to that of Niebuhr himself.
Fundamental as this is maintained to be, it is by no 
means, a simple task to define accurately and yet concisely 
exactly what is meant by these terms. Although philosophical 
and theological definitions abound, it is clear that to make
use of them would make this a thesis on metaphysics. To the
knowledge of the author, a political definition qua definition 
has not existed until recently and most latter-day ’'Realists” 
like Hans J. Morgenthau have been content to make extended 
descriptions.3 Even the usually-reliable political diction­
aries seem unwilling to do more than list common usages, ob­
serve that these should not be confused with the metaphysical 
meanings they might otherwise have, and suggest referring to 
the collected works of a few individuals who consider them­
selves members of one group or another.1*
However in 1951» John H. Herz attempted just such a 
definition by positing the reality of what he calls the "se­
curity and power" dilemma and then examining the extent to 
which various theories recognise this reality.^ However by
3s@© Wat. T, Bluhra, ,,gf PplA,tl.cj,,1..3ystem,
New York, 1965* P* 179? and Morgenthau's introduction to his 
own book Polities .Among nations. New York, 1962, pp. 3-15.
**The best dictionary to appear in recent years is
Joseph Dunner's Met.ionary..J3f Political Science. (Philosophical
Library), New York, 196*+, yet even this otherwise superb volume 
limits Itself to the above observations.
5John H. Herz, Political Realism and .Political. ..Idealism.
Chicago, 196*+, pp. 18-19* Herz defines Realism in the follow- 
ing manner* " (It) ... characterizes that type of political
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8adhering to a certain position with regard to the nature of 
the real world, Herz limited his definition unnecessarily and 
thereby failed to find the objective criterion he sought. The 
nucleus of his definitions, on the other hand, represents a 
valuable contribution to any understanding of the terms, for 
it advances the novel idea that the relationship between the 
empirical order as he understood it and the ideal order as 
anyone might choose to paint it, was and is a key which would 
Illuminate features common to seemingly dissimilar theorists. 
From this argument that certain thinkers are joined by a com­
mon bond and are to be distinguished from another group of 
thinkers in terms of eaeh’s understanding of this relationship, 
arises Harz’s conviction that the typology of political thought 
and behaviour ha has presented is, in his words, ’’applicable 
to events throughout known history".^ But if it is possible 
to devise a criterion based on the relationship between the 
empirical order, not as a Realist understands it (which is 
what Herz admittedly is) but as both Realist and Idealist 
might understand It, and the ideal order also as it might be 
generally understood, the result might be more objective and, 
it is hoped, universally valid.
thought which ... recognizes ... the implications for political 
life of those security and power factors which ... are inherent 
in human society.” Likewise he says* ’’Political Idealism ... 
is characteristic of that type of political thinking which ... 
does not recognize the problems arising from the security and 
power dilemma ... .” Herz obviously has to assume the irration­
al nature of human society* how does he classify the thinker 
who, as unlikely as It may seem to Herz, sees no contradiction 
to be resolved between the empirical and ideal orders?
6Herz, ag.,„glt., p. v.
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9To this end, a new definition would be phrased as
follows i
POLITICAL IDEALISM is defined as any political 
theory which in its particular conception of the 
nature of man, politics, and society, by effect or 
by design resolves any seeming contradiction be­
tween existing impulses in the empirical world 
and the historical attainability of a rational 
and moral order derived from universally valid 
abstract principles.
A closer look at the terms of the definition of Polit­
ical Idealism may facilitate the reader’s efforts to apply the 
concept to individual thinkers. Key words or phrases which 
may stand in need of explication would seem to be* ’’existing 
impulses”, ’’historical”, and ’’rational and moral order”: other­
wise their Interaction would not seem to merit Individual at­
tention*
It should be noted that the complete phrase Is:
’’ . *. resolves any seeming contradiction between existing 
Impulses”. Again it must be stressed that it is not necessary 
to credit any contradiction whatsoever, for to do so would 
imply a certain type of preconception with regard to the em­
pirical order. This definition avoids Herz's unnecessary re­
striction, although the restrletlveness involved In the latter 
exists only if Herz wishes to include all political thinkers.
In practice, most political scientists have been willing to 
concede at least an apparent conflict between the empirical 
order and the ideal world. Thus by ’’existing Impulses” is 
meant those forces which by themselves or in combination, have 
mad® the history of man read like a chronicle of the ravages
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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of power, exploitation, inequality, wars, and other conflicts. 
In short it is man’s proclivity to indulge himself at monoto­
nously regular Intervals in activities associated at one time 
with a "state of nature" (in a Hobbesian sense), and more 
generally in a cynical age, accepted as part of the empirical 
order as it is known now or at any particular time. The drives 
which inform this behaviour are referred to by several names, 
most popularly, the will-to-Iive and the often
summed up in that most eloquent of French phrases, la condition 
humaine. What essentially is meant by this is that the "will- 
to-live" and Its natural corollary, the "will-to-power", when 
in combination, produce a tragic paradox. One man’s desire to 
perpetuate his existence causes him to regard everything as a 
potential threat to that aim* To Insure himself better against 
the effects of such threats, he seeks after power, and his 
safety is measured In terms of the power differential between 
himself and others* But if A gains power, it is by definition 
an automatic threat to the "wlll-to-llv@" of B and so B must 
make up that difference. This spurs A on again and the spiral 
has commenced. This quest is at the same time self-assertive 
and self-destructive. While various imposed primitive orders 
may have mitigated the circumstances under which this struggle 
took place, so far in history it has not been eliminated. One 
has only to witness the sorry tale of man’s existence up to 
now to testify to that. In other words, this is man’s egotism. 
Obviously the phrase "existing Impulses” should not be taken 
to refer to any alleged "pity instinct", or if it Includes
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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that, it should mean more properly those forces which hare 
historically prevented man from giving full play to such an 
instinct, whether imposed from within or necessitated from 
without. Like John Hera, one may wish to commit oneself as 
to the exact nature of these impulses by using the term ’’se­
curity and power dilemma”, and buttress it with illustrations 
taken from any Freshman Sociology text* or one may be satis­
fied to describe them more generally? but what is underlined 
here and what is universally agreed upon, is their effect.
What they will be specifically depends ultimately on one's 
view of the nature of man, politics, and society.
The word ’’historical” In the sans® in which it is 
employed in the definition, is much more than a "time back 
there concept”. It is the total duration of man's temporal 
or secular existence prior to an apocalyptic denouement. 
Hothing can be said about what man may or may not achieve 
during this period, for that depends on one's view of the 
nature of man, but as one author has suggested, it is "the 
depth dimension of our present.Which is to say that it is 
past, present, and future seen in terms of all of man's limi­
tations and/or freedom* In some systems of thought, "history” 
is limited to that length of time man takes to achieve per­
fection, but it is a matter of much confusion whether the 
exact moment of the achievement of that perfection falls on 
the historical or post-historical side of the great dividing
/Gordon Harland, m M M k t  £g. » New
York, I960, p.91*
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line5 all of which again makes man’s achievements a poor cri­
terion. Thus, where the words ’’history” or ’’historical” appear 
to be used in this study in a specific sense, an eschatological 
criterion will be implied. It should therefore be kept in mind 
that what lies "outside history” remains beyond the competence 
of man, polities, and society no matter how they are defined. 
Moreover it remains beyond the competence of this thesis whose 
concern is with differing concepts of the ’possible' "within 
history”.
With regard to a ”rational and moral order”, there is 
no attempt here to stipulate what values will inform the con­
cept, how they are obtained or how they relate to that order.
It suffices to state that the order is somehow derived from 
these ultimate values and that this makes it ’moral”. However, 
it must be remembered that this conceptual world is both moral 
and rational. This is necessary if only because throughout 
history men have been less than satisfied with the prospect 
that reason and obligation might sometimes conflict. As such, 
the use of the word ”rational” includes what is commonly under­
stood by the term (the nationalist school’s belief in the 
appropriateness of reason alone to all aspects of human exist­
ence), but also means more than this and may therefore require 
explanation. In this case, ’’rational” refers to the fact that 
the posited order has, in theory, already reconciled any con­
flict between the previously mentioned egotistic Impulses of 
man and the moral requirements of that order. An easy harmony 
is thereby established between that which is right and that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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which is reasonable.
Having established that the Political Idealist upholds 
the proposition ’’what should be, can be”, all that remains is 
to discuss various concepts which will generally attend this 
attitude, or can be derived from it. While Political Idealism 
is literally any theory which holds to the attainability of a 
posited order within history, more typically it takes the form 
of Individualism, Humanism, liberalism, Rationalism, Pacifism, 
Internationalism, and even Anarchism (included in the category 
of liberalism is so-called ’’hard liberalism” or Marxism, which 
is often a very confusing element in this category of Idealism - 
for while it employs Realist analysis, it does so for Idealist 
ends). All of these schools must try to establish a connection 
between the ideals they champion and the actual history of man
Q
in society, a feat which is usually accomplished in one of 
several ways. One may put forward political ideals as goals 
of political action, to be realised in a more or less distant 
future through the operation of an "objective trend” or "nec­
essary development" as discerned through a philosophy of his­
tory (Marxism)* Without relying on any "Inevitability", one 
may attempt to demonstrate that the attainment of the political 
ideals merely attends the fullest expression of those selfish 
but enlightened interests which have traditionally motivated
8 'man in society' is historical man, Thus this con­
nection between Utopia and the history of man cannot be pro­
vided by any reference to a Golden Age in the sens® of the 
Christo-Judaic "Garden of Bden". Man 'before the Pall' Is no 
less outside History than is Man 'after the Day of Judgment'.
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m m  (laissez-faire),9 Or on© may at the very least demonstrate 
that present and past exist in a neutral limbo, awaiting as it 
were, but not advancing toward, the ideal.
To do this, the Political Idealist must promote one 
of several ideas as to the nature of the already-mentioned 
Mexisting Impulses”, He may assert that the "impulses" do not 
exist, in which case he must devise some other explanation for 
the disorder that the rest of humanity appears to find in the 
empirical world# H© may assert that the "impulses" tend to­
ward a natural harmony. He may assert that the "Impulses" are 
transitory and malleable, in which case he opts for "free 
will". (The assertion that the "impulses" are part of a grand 
design of objective laws is not typical of Idealism but is a 
determinist argument borrowed by Marxists from the Realist 
school and used out of context.) Thus the Idealist (excluding 
the Marxist)' is necessarily voluntarist. Any failure so far 
to attain the "good order" is thereby shown to be derived 
from man's wickedness or stupidity or both. Thus by an act 
of will, "reality" is altered (in actual fact, rejected) and
^Th® reference here is to what might b® called "clas­
sical" laissez-faire which states that an invisible hand per­
mits the individual to seek his own (true) gain and at the same 
time, consciously or unconsciously promote the general Interest 
of society. As S.H. Carr points out (op.cit.. p.^2-3), if the 
individual behaves badly, it is because he is short-sighted 
and muddle-headed. Superficially, laissez-faire might be seen 
as an easy identity of and ought (thus its usefulness to 
conservatives in preserving the status-quo), when it is really 
on® of ought and ought on different levels of social structure. 
As well, it should be pointed out that the Social Darwinist 
variant of laissez-faire has more in common with the previous 
example of Marxism than it has with laissez-faire as discussed 
in this context, especially with regard to the determinism of 
the former.
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the m y  paved for an ultimate solution.
fery little time has been spent so far in dealing with 
the Realist position. As an approach to politics, it developed 
as a reaction against Political Idealism and because of this, 
and its generally-acknowledged "pessimistic outlook" (sometimes 
erroneously called 'cynicism'), it is most often described in 
terms of what Idealism is not. While this method may be at­
tractive, it is not the stuff of which definitions are made, 
for it is the impression of the author that unlike definition 
which attempts to grasp the essence of something, description 
will Involve a comparison with something else and may be im­
plied in terms of an antithesis* Accordingly, a positive 
statement (definition) of the concept of Realism is as follows*
POLITICAL REALISM is defined as any political 
theory which postulates historic and existing im­
pulses in the nature of man* politics, and society 
as fixed and immutable realities which determine 
the basic and enduring irrationality of historical 
political existence.
While the remarks preceding the above definition were 
addressed specifically to the concept of Political Idealism, 
it should require little mental effort on the part of the 
reader to extend them to the definition of Political Realism. 
Disregarding the addition of the word "historic" (in its com­
monly understood usage) to the phrase "existing impulses", 
the phrase "fixed and Immutable realities" (which should be 
self-explanatory), and the antonym "irrationality", the phra­
seology is similar to that of the former definition. Never­
theless, so that the category may be completely understood, a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
few general remarks will be addressed to the Implications of 
the position* Realism recognises the effects of a basic ir­
rationality which Is assumed to govern political life, and 
bases its theories and observations upon the phenomena of 
Existing impulses” as understood by them. Thus the Realist 
must emphasise the irresistible strength of these impulses 
in a pre-determined existence which he is powerless to change. 
He thinks in terms of causality in statings ’’what is, must be 
the limit of what can be”. He also regards those same values 
which the Idealists proclaim, as being derived from this ir­
rational political existence| the implication of which is that 
ethics is a tool of polities. However any attempt to glorify 
the ’Is1 as an ’ought to be' lies beyond the capacity of the 
Realist qua Realist and while there is an observable tendency 
toward this, it is not intrinsic to the school. Generally 
the Realist has no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that 
any Idealist proposition is not ’fact’ but ’aspiration', and 
will go on to demonstrate that far from being a priori prop­
ositions, they are completely rooted by cause and effect in 
the world of ’reality’.
No attempt will be made at this time to chronicle the 
charges that each side levels at the other, or to suggest 
weaknesses in each position. These may or may not be evident, 
but this is not Important, for these implications of the op­
position between Idealism and Realism will develop slowly 
from a more detailed study of their applicability to the 
political thought of Relnhold Niebuhr.
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These then are the major statements of each concept. 
Ever7 political theorist must at any particular point in his 
system opt for one school or the other, for it is not possible 
to. embrace all the elements of both in one consistent theme. 
Nevertheless there are writers who for one reason or another, 
have attempted to incorporate in their work elements of theory 
which upon closer inspection are revealed to have been derived 
from the opposite school to which one would normally assign 
the writer. In Aristotle's Politics. Books I - III, VII, and 
VIII belong to the Idealist school while Books IV, V, and VI 
were more concerned with empirical investigation.10 The di­
vine history and the profane history in Augustine's Citv of 
God are outlined in parallel, but are never fused. Marx has 
already been mentioned in this context as what Bluhm calls a 
"brldgebullder". That man such as the aforementioned should 
prove the exception rather than the rule, will become clearer 
as the features of each concept are applied to Relnhold 
Niebuhr. However, the fact that few writers stand in both 
camps to any significant degree, should not be taken to mean 
that most authors are unwilling to make use of opportunities 
for reconciling opposing theories. This often makes for con­
fusion in analysis.
It will be recalled that mention has been made of 
certain requirements which must be met in order that this 
classification might be considered meaningful. The remainder
l°Georg@ H. Sabine, A...History of Political Theory.
New York, 1961, pp. 98-105.
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of tills chapter will be devoted to a discussion of this aspect.
The antithesis of utonla and reality, or so it might 
be termed, is perhaps the commonest phenomenon in all of pol­
itics. Every citizen, if he has any political consciousness 
at all, is at least dimly aware of the frustration caused by 
a comparison of what is and what might be. Nowhere is this 
more vividly shown than in the field of international politics 
which is particularly susceptible to outbursts of wishful 
thinking disguised as ultimata solutions. How many times has 
the wish been expressed that if only common, hard-working, 
blunt-talking folk on both sides of the Iron Curtain were to 
sit around the conference table instead of all those diplomats, 
how soon everything would be cleared up I By merely substitu­
ting nouns and adjectives in that sentence, it could serve as 
an all-purpose form whose blanks could be filled according 
to the situation, and made to apply to political problems in 
every century since man emerged from caves. This attitude 
has by no means been limited to the political masses. In his 
column in the Toronto Slobe and Mall of Wednesday, February 
16th, 1966, Richard J. Needham quotes ex-President of the 
United States, Harry Truman in the following manners
"It all seems to have been in vain. Memories 
&r© short, and app«t±t®» for power and glory 
are insatiable. Old tyrants depart. New ones 
take their places. Old differences are composed, 
new differences arise? old allies become the 
foe, the recent enemy becomes the friend. It 
is all very baffling and trying."H
11 Richard Needham, The M stiO t Feb. 16, 1966,
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Mr* Truman here speaks with the disillusionment and cynicism, 
not of the Realist, but of the frustrated Idealist or as Need­
ham calls it, the Dawnist* "Bawnism", Needham describes as, 
"the idea that by some wondrous method you can set up a 
brave new world in which all are happy and healthy and harmo­
nious, where the lion lies down with the lamb ... Unfor­
tunately the columnist feels that this is characteristically 
American, but while it cannot be doubted that the American 
nation has suffered from this to a greater extent than have 
her more sophisticated counterparts in old Europe, it is to 
be seriously questioned whether It is a point of view limited 
solely to the New World. Marx after all was a German, Lenin 
was a Russian, and the League of Nations dream-world was never 
joined by the Americans.
All men when they think politically, long for a better 
order —  for all men, when they think politically, think with 
a purpose. Thus all political thought in its inception has 
an expressed desire to move from the present tense to the 
future tense in the form of an "if, then" sequence. It Is 
obvious however, that any statement on what the future may 
hold depends entirely on one's understanding of the present, 
which in turn is a function of knowledge of the past. Com­
monly, attributing 'utopianism* to a political idea Indicates 
one's basic disagreement with the particular view of the fu­
ture that the idea advances, while attributing 'realism* in­
dicates approbation. More than this, each is a comment on 
the Idea's implied concept of the present and the past and
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the relationship between them*
It can be argued that the present is no more knowable* 
than the past or the future. Yet even in the absence of such 
knowledge, terms such as ‘utopian* and ’realistic’ are con­
tinually used, quite often without much meaning or content.
It has been the primary task of this first chapter to ground 
these concepts in a theoretical base divorced from a prior 
commitment as to what reality is. Thus this theoretical base 
consists of differing concepts, not of the empirical world 
and the rational ideal, but of the relationship in history 
between the two, whatever they may be.
This then is the purpose of the distinction between 
Realism and Idealism —  to provide an objective and universal 
means of grouping all political systems, in the light of which 
the scheme’s efficacy and fruitfulness must be judged. In 
other words, If all political thought asks three great ques­
tions* ’’what is desirable?”, “what is possible?” and “how can 
it best be attained?”, a fundamental division in terms of the 
answers given to any of these questions will be meaningful to 
academic Inquiry. The selection in this instance, of the 
second question —  “what is possible?”, should not be seen to 
imply that this is more important than the first* quite ob­
viously any complete political system must answer both. It 
is simply that the “Reallsm-Idealism” dichotomy Inherent in 
the second question but not In the first (or third, for that 
matter), permits an examination of all political thought with­
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out prejudgment of either the metaphysical underpinnings of 
each system or Its rationality. Moreover, it is only within 
recent years that the ’’utopian-realist” contrast has been used 
as a basis for analysis, although for the large part there has 
been no contrast involved (for years men have, as in the battle 
of the sexes, agreed to admit the difference but have never 
defined it), but simply an examination of Utopians or Realists 
within their respective schools. Accordingly, this chapter 
may be seen as an attempt to remedy a situation in which an 
entire aspect of political analysis has been overlooked.
Finally, there are two very practical considerations 
to which this classification must answer. It would be most 
amusing, not to say disheartening, to go to the trouble of 
idealizing two basic types, only to find that nearly all po­
litical theorists belong to one and but an insignificant mi­
nority to the other, or, what is worse, that everyone falls 
more or less near the middle. The reader may reassure himself 
on this scores there are substantial numbers on both sides of 
the great divide and only a tiny minority have feet in both
l2Studies such ass George Kateb, Utopia and Its Enemies.
Mew York, 1963; U.M. Shklar, After Utopia. Princeton. 1957s
G. Negly and J.M. Patrick, . S l M t . . . N e w  York, 1952; 
B.P. Skinner, New York, 19^8; Karl Popper. 149,-QP.aa
aaaigfcLJB&JUgJfelfalgH» Princeton, 1950* and Barrington Moore, 
E f i X l t l c j g X f f l t t P J Q r . i  Cambridge, 1958; concern 
themselves solely with one school or the other and as such are 
never bothered with the problem of definition. The reader is 
vaguely aware of the fact that both he and the respective au­
thors may share some notion of what these groups are, and this 
presumably takes the place of definition. Contrast this with 
Herz’s which consti­
tutes the sol® effort to consider both schools at the same 
time over the broad range of political thought.
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camps. This 1$ necessarily so, because of the antithetical 
character of the distinction, and it may be seriously argued 
that even this minority has substituted pretension for logic, 
or as others claim, theology for political science.
Obviously, the second question in the mind of the 
reader must concern the applicability of the categorization 
herein evolved, to the political thought of Reinhold Niebuhr.
It is significant that it will be shown throughout the remain­
der of the thesis that he belongs to that minority which com­
bines elements of both schools, as the title of this study 
would indicate. It is hoped that the great significance of 
his contribution to political thought in general and inter­
national relations in particular, will be underscored or even 
highlighted by viewing Niebuhr from the vantage point of an 
awareness of the differences between the Realist school and 
the Idealist school* Like Marx, he takes elements from both: 
unlike Marx, in the end he transcends both.
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CHAPTER II
THE ROOTS OF NIEBUHR'S POLITICAL THOUGHT
Les deux sujets ©nt grandi concurrement 
dans mon ©sprit, 1 'excds de l'un trouvant dans 
I'excis de 1 'autre une permission secrete et 
tous deux s@ maintenant en equilibre.
ANDRE GIDE, Journal, page 365•
The difficulty of placing Reinhold Niebuhr in any neat 
category confronts his students and critics alike, at all levels 
of discussion. No attempt to capture the genius of the man 
either at a point in time or in a field of endeavour can pos­
sibly succeed, and certainly no effort to superimpose upon his 
life's work a rigid systematic framework will ever bear fruit.
It is at once an admission of the dynamism of his thought and 
a testament to the diversity of his interests that Niebuhr can 
only be likened to Stephen Leacock's Lord Ronald who flung him­
self upon his horse and rode madly off in all directions.
McCall's refers to Niebuhr as America's leading Prot­
estant theologian. Halter Lippman and Hans Morgenthau con­
sider him a practical political strategist and a theoretical 
Interpreter of politics.2 Nathan Scott himself calls Niebuhr
•^McCall*s. John Cogley, "An Interview with Relnhold 
Niebuhr", February 1966, page 90.
2Nathan A. Scott, Relnhold Niebuhr. Minneapolis, 1963, 
p.8 j see also Hans Morgenthau's article in Relnhold Niebuhr?
A Prophetic Voice in OurTime. Greenwich, 1962.
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a theological anthropologist.3 Charles Fraokel sees him as a 
philosopher of history*1* will Horberg describes Niebuhr as 
the leading spokesman of Conservatism.5 C.f* Crabb regards 
hi* as the primary critic of the Baalist school while 'Hobart 
Osgood, on the other hand, calls Niebuhr a primary critic of 
tli# Idealist school.? Paul Ramsey considers hi* above all a 
moralist.9 It will b@ noted that all thus® references hav# 
b##n culltd from discussions of Niebuhr written within th# 
last six years. If os# war# to take in a span of fifty years, 
os# would sat that ha has also b##n considered at various times 
a pacifist, socialist, Marxist, liberal, and adherent of the 
Social Gospel, to mention just a few of his titles. The final 
word perhaps comes from William Bluha who sees Niebuhr as "at 
once a theologian, metaphysician, ©pistemolagist, moral philos­
opher, psychologist, and student of politics".9
All these labels relate to Niebuhr*s direction of 
thought and/or vocation# And all are in a sense correct, yet 
non© speaks the whole truth. «?©r# one to take as a basis any
^Nathan Scott, P*9.
Charles Frankel, XMSMM,,j£ULM9Mm.„Hm» Boston, 1962.
* 60iff cpS$l Aasriiau^gagalga. Policyin the Nuclear Age. 
Bvaaston, 111., I960.
Burkean i
"Relnhold Niebuhri 
• P*379#
B m l m ,
7r *». Osgood,
, IsMm&f Chicago, 1961, pp.381-3.
N.J., 1962.
%aul lamsey, Inglewood Cliffs,
#
9Bluhm, P.6B.
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of his shifting tactical positions, th® confusion would be 
multiplied. In the span of his life he has been violently for 
and against Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Church­
ill, the New Deal, American participation in the Second World'
loWar and Keynesian fiscal policy. On these points the contra­
diction has been real$ on a good many others it has only existed 
in th® minds of his, at times, bewildered audience. Both John
H. Yoder and Ball Brunner admit that most people consign Nie­
buhr to th® ranks of "Hao-Orthodoxy" with all that that means, 
and both proceed to argue that this is a rais-nomer derived
from public confusion, not as to what "Neo-Orthodoxy” stands
11for, but what Niebuhr says. Unacquainted with Niebuhr’s 
rather original use of terms such as "cynicism”, "idealism", 
and "original sin”, popular understanding of the subtleties of 
his argument is, on occasion, minimal. Robert C. Good under­
states the case if anything, when he says euphemistically: "It
should be held In mind that Niebuhr is not a definitional writ­
er. ”1^
The background to this apparent Inconsistency may be 
seen In th® fact that Niebuhr’s life neatly divides into five
10Sea Arthur Schl©singer Jr., "Reinhold Niebuhr’s Role 
in American Political Thought and Lire", in Kagley and Bretall,
plaMLd^N.i.$buhrs JffiUJtolUlflat, social. m dffpiUtical Thought,
Toronto, 1956.
lxJ.H. Yoder, EelhhoM Niebuhr and Christian Pacifism. 
New York, 1961, p.H-f and Emil Brunner’s article In Kegley and 
Bretall, op.cit.. pp.28-33.
12r .c . Good's thesis, The Contribution of .ReinholdJLle-
feuM ?ale University,
1956, p.8 (microfilm). , *, rv^
1 “-v-O 7 /4
UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR LIBRARY
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periods* conforming with five separate stages of the develop­
ment of his political and religious thought.*3 The point is 
that the commentator is at a loss to state categorically what 
Niebuhr’s thought is, What inspired him in 1926, he refuted 
in 1935, and then proceeded to synthesise in 1952. To the 
best of the author’s knowledge, this process is continuing 
presently. Thus the present task of discussing Niebuhr’s thought 
Is not unlike attempting to capture the fleeting images of a 
kaleidoscope by engraving them on a wood-cut. The rapidity 
with which each succeeding impression resolves into a different 
yet related pattern, is matched by the painful sluggishness and 
immobility of the portraying medium.
Finally, it is patently obvious that Niebuhr simply 
will not conform to any one pre-ordained categorization based 
on a theoretical structure. True to his early schooling in 
Marxist methodology, his thought proceeds in crab-like dialec­
tic fashion from one position to its opposite, and then com­
bines and transcends both. 4s Scott observesi "It (his thought) 
has always been hammered out in the process of his responding 
to whatever presented Itself as problematic in the social and 
political environment of his time.”1-1* Niebuhr is at once th© 
iconoclast and the polemicist. Words such as ’’dialogue", "dy­
namic", "tension", and "possibilities" repeat themselves con­
sistently, and show him to be ill at ease in any extreme posi-
^ibid.» p.l, (Table of Contents).
l5+Nathan 4. Scott, on.cit., p.9.
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tion for long. Some authors art tempted to suggest that Niebuhr 
stands in the tradition of Plato, St. Augustin® and Burke —  
more in their capacities as individuals — - (Bluhm is one who 
suggests this), but on® cannot help noticing an accompanying 
wariness of extending these comparisons too far. If there is 
any consensus among Niebuhr's reviewers it must lie primarily 
in this facts that her© is a dynamic creative thinker not to b® 
contained by any ready-made analogies. Admittedly he is a 
Christian? more specifically he is an apologist for th© "genius” 
of th® Hebralc-Christian tradition, as he calls it. Yet what 
has on® revealed after saying this? Most of Western thought 
has derived its ultimate values from this source and the Chris­
tian Church has an exceedingly large roof. Billy Graham and 
Rudolph Bultmann have at least two things In common* both are 
Christians and neither cares much for Niebuhr's Christology.
Thus in the end, th© only label that can be applied proves too 
broad to be of any us®.
Niebuhr himself is of little help in the search for a 
title to pin on him, not least because, while he is fond of 
using labels to spot the flaws in the arguments of his opponents, 
he objects to their use in his case. Many times he has stated 
that he is only a political scientist by "avocation”. In his 
opening remarks to the Kegley and Bretall study, he says* "I 
cannot and do not claim to be a theologian. I have never been 
vary competent in the nice points of pure theology.Whatever
■^Kegley and Bretall, op.cit., p.3*
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It is that he feels competent to do, he is not about to disclose 
it. Nor is he prepared to apply a political label to himself —  
perhaps wisely, for while h® regards himself as a 'liberal*, 
he reserves the right to coin his own meaning for the word ... 
which turns out to be a hybrid combination of a Burkean con- 
sarvative with a liberal conscience, although not quite. He 
admits to being a Christian, although he implies a qualifica­
tion when he states* "When religions claim to be absolute be­
cause they have a revelation from God, I'm as skeptical as the 
village atheist.'1^'7 As Samuel Johnson might have said, Dr. * 
Niebuhr is a very unclubable man.
Notwithstanding the difficulties which have been out­
lined above, some Justification must be offered for discussing 
Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr in the context which has been suggested by 
the title of this thesis. This Justification, i.e., that Nie­
buhr has a particular field of endeavour which can be related 
to the topic under discussion? that it is indeed possible to 
distinguish between his mature thought and the confusing strains 
which led up to it? and that there exists a framework into 
which his thought can be fitted, —  rests on the following 
three assertions* 1) that Niebuhr's vocation is Applied Theol­
ogy and therefor® as much Political Science as anything else?
2 ) that what he has written since 1936 constitutes his finely-
^MeCall's, p.166.
17IMA* i p.171.
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honed political thought; and 3) that Niebuhr is, for want of a 
better term, a Realist-Idealist. These assertions will be dis­
cussed as listed.
For Reinhold Niebuhr, theology and politics are not 
separate fields but merely two perspectives of a single reality. 
That he could hold this opinion In contradistinction to that 
of many of his fellow academics, would seem to indicate a dif­
ference in orientation to theology similar to that which exists 
in the sciences between Physics and Engineering, Far from being 
th© cloistered systematic theologian so often produced by Euro­
pean divinity schools, Niebuhr has deliberately set out, as 
Paul Lehmann puts it, "to overcome the estrangement of the
modern mind from th® insights and content of the Christian 
18faith". Niebuhr is enough of a theologian to attempt to 
demonstrate the truth of the Christian faith, but at the same 
time, he is enough of a pragmatist to attempt to demonstrate 
its relevance as well. It is this admixture which justifies 
the term "Applied Theology". In theory, this vocation (that 
is, Applied Theology) should involve him in politics as much 
as in theology. In practice, it has.
As Robert Good notes in both his doctoral thesis and 
in his book, six (sic) of Niebuhr’s eighteen (sic) books have 
dealt primarily with political problems and none has ignored 
the political field entirely.The same observation applies
iSKegley and Bretall, QP.clt.. p.253.
^Bibliographical details can be obtained in Robert 
Good’s thesis, oo.oit.. pp.I-1*, and In Robert C. Good and H.R,
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to liis more than 1500 articles which have produced a torrent 
of comment on current events. He has produced major studies 
In International Relations In such journals as the American
iMlfilaSf the ilrglmu .Quarterly Review« Foreign.Affairs. the
tia£]A.Jto&X£L8Mt and International Organization.
His writings for the classroom Include contributions to th® 
following volumes* Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth Thompson
(ads.), .Principles and Problems of ..International. Politics. Hew
York, 1952; William Sbansteln, (ed.), Man.and..the State* Modern
.Political. Ideas« lew York, 1957; Karl De Schweinitz and Kenneth
Thompson (eds.), Man and .Modern Society. Hew York, 1953; and
Frederick H. Hartmann (ed.), Readings in International Rela­
tions . New York, 1952. He is, at the moment of writing, editor 
of the bi-monthly Christianity and Crisis, and has contributed
frequently to th® .Hat tonal Review. Atlantic Monthly, the Ration.
the M m J m M Z f  the and ila££££l£> to name just a
few.
Davis, Beinhold Niebuhr On Politics. Hew York, I960 (a volume
of comment and source material).Nathan A. Scott, op.cit.. also 
provides a list of Niebuhr's accomplishments on paged. With 
respect however to Good's figures of six and eighteen respec­
tively, nowhere is it clear which six he means, and the figure 
eighteen obviously does not include what one must presume to be
Niebuhr's final work on politics, MpktJ.  fihMttr,
nltifl.3. (1965). In addition to the latter, there would seem to 
be seven works exclusively devoted to polities as opposed to a 
philosophy of history or theology, to wit* Moraj Mm.ftM 
amMftflA&faC (1933)! ChrJj?M_anity and Power Politics (19H0);
 ShildrenTof Light, and the Children of Darkness (1 9 W  * Jhe
(1952); Chr.ls.tlan Realism and Pollt-
la L Il.a M .ia i (1953); E.lom„aM (1958); and
atmc.tur.8. of... .Nations and. lamtmg. (19597. All were published in
New York City*
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If this war© not enough to qualify him as a political 
scientist, there are as well, many examples of his active in­
terest in politics. In his early years, he often ran for pub­
lic office as a Socialist and has held positions of leadership 
in such groups as United for Democratic Action, the Liberal 
Party of Mew York, th# American Association for Democratic 
Germany, and the Resettlement Campaign for Exiled Professionals. 
In th© fall of 19*4-6 he was a member of a State Department mis­
sion to Germany and was appointed in 19*+9 as an official rep­
resentative to the fourth session of the General Conference of 
UNESCO. H© has since frequently served as an informal consult­
ant to members of the policy planning staff of the State Depart­
ment and is at present a Research Associate at Columbia Univer­
sity’s Institute for War and Peace Studies. It is a wonder 
that he has found time to be a theologian.
Every student of Niebuhr’s thought, whether it be in 
politics, philosophy, or theology, has at on© time or another 
had to grapple with the problem of what may properly be con­
sidered to b® that ’thought'. His political writings, though 
extensive, have never been systematic. In a sense, he has had 
th© annoying habit of thinking out loud for fifty years —  a 
practice which, although provocative and thoroughly honest, al­
lows for the existence in published form, of ideas and opinions 
long-since abandoned, outgrown, and repudiated by their own au­
thor. Moreover, while he has written his magnum onus in the­
ology (The Nature andDestiny of Man), much of his political 
thought lies scattered carelessly throughout his near score of
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books and countless occasional articles long out of print, the 
implications of which have only been brought out in his last 
book. Were this thesis to be a treatment of the evolution of 
Niebuhr’s thought, there would be little problem. However, 
since the Intention is to discuss his mature philosophy of pol­
itics, it is first necessary to look for a watershed.
Anyone at all acquainted with Niebuhr’s life is at 
least dimly aware of the fact that Niebuhr went through two 
very difficult periods in the evolution of his thought. In the 
Introduction to Robert Good’s thesis already mentioned, these 
periods are labelled according to the prevailing philosophy 
Niebuhr espoused* in the first case, Idealism and its resultant 
disillusionment (1913-1927)* and in the second, Realism (1928- 
1935). thus the year 1936 Is a seminal year for many reasons. 
That year saw the beginning of his attempts to structure a syn­
thesis of the two violent periods he had just gone through. It 
was in that year that he began to be reconciled to the New Deal. 
It was In that year that he published his book Bevond Tragedy, 
in many respects itself a seminal book. 1936 was the year he 
began to be worried about a re-emerging Germany and the conse­
quences of this for the TJnlted States. Thereafter, Niebuhr 
seemed content with the basic framework of his thought —  based 
not on a fixed and closed system, but on th® absence of one —  
and what has followed has been a series of variations on that 
them®. Consequently, the basis of discussion in this thesis 
must be understood to be Niebuhr’s thought as it has been pre­
sented since 1936, although for illustration or clarification,
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reference may be made from time to time to attitudes held prior 
to that date.
However, the contention that it is indeed possible to 
grasp Niebuhr’s mature thought rests on even more solid ground 
than this. Unlike previous efforts to discuss Niebuhr’s po­
litical thought, this present thesis has enjoyed a fortuitous 
advantage in that its composition has coincided with the ap­
pearance of what Is advertised as Niebuhr's final book on pol­
itics. Man’s Mature and H-ls Communities may in fact be consid­
ered to be th© nearest thing to a magnum onus on politics in 
this case, for it would have been possible to write this entire 
thesis on the basis of that work alone. Bvery previously woven 
strand in Niebuhr’s political fabric is presented and refined 
thereinj unfortunately however, the author seems after forty or 
so years to have grown tired of giving those detailed explana­
tions and directions without which it is almost impossible for 
the reader to follow the convoluted reasoning. Thus a tacit 
assumption that the reader has already read his preceding works 
seems to pervade the book.
As previously stated, the subject matter of this study 
rests on three basic premises. Th® first two have already been 
dealt with in the space of one or two pages each, but the third 
will require considerably more detailed treatment, for obvious 
reasons. The question of a suitable framework or category for 
Niebuhr’s thought is in essence, another way of phrasing the 
title of this thesis, and as such will constitute the remainder
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of th# body of this examination.
It is pointless to attempt to fathom the source of the 
dichotomy which informs all of Relnhold Niebuhr* s thought in 
general, or in this case, the roots of his political thought, 
without first grounding the discussion in some understanding 
of the formative years in Niebuhr’s life when this thought was 
developing. Th© disposition to encompass two conflicting 
streams of thought —  Realism and Idealism —  In one explana­
tion of man, politics, and society, obviously did not arise out 
of a vacuum. Nor did the ability to appreciate elements in both 
merely reflect an acquired academic ambivalence designed to pass 
for objectivity. In th© ease of th© former, the desire to find 
a synthesis was a legacy handed from father to son*, in the lat­
ter, the attractions of Baalism and Idealism were a product of 
Niebuhr’s own contact with the world around him.
In his *'Intellectual Biography” prefacing th© Kegloy 
and Bretall study, Niebuhr begins by acknowledging one of the 
greatest Influences in his life, that of his father, Rev. Gustav 
Niebuhr. Unfortunately, non® of Niebuhr's reviewers have devoted 
much time or effort to examining this particular aspect of his 
development to assess its effects upon his thought, and only 
June Bingham has described this segment of his life in any de­
tail .20 That one family could produce two of America's leading 
theologians —  Reinhold and his brother Helmut Richard —  would 
seem to denote more than coincidence, or more positively, point
20June Bingham, figam g&Jffl,,jjfanagftiL New York, 1961, 
pp. if 9-6 5.
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to an environmental factor in the person of the father. One 
might even be tempted to argue “heredity0 were that not some­
what out of style. Nevertheless, it is surprising that this 
factor should be so generally ignored.
Gustav Niebuhr, an amateur historian and theologian in 
his own right, in the words of his son Reinhold* M ... intro­
duced his sons and daughter to the thought of (Adolf) Hamack 
without fully sharing the liberal convictions of that theolo­
gian."21 Neither was he about to forget the German conservative 
reactionism on the other hand, from which he had fled. Gustav 
saw the difficulties inherent in the total view of both atti­
tudes and as was usual with him, embarked on an independent mid­
dle road, using as the only guide, Macaulay's epigram that 
’nothing is so useless a® a general maxim'. Moreover he was no 
ivory-tower academician. He constantly attempted to bring his 
thought into focus with reality by being engaged in community 
work and as far as the local German-immigrant farmers were con­
cerned, “spent a good deal of time trying to beguile them from 
their rather unconstructlve conservatism."22 The image of his 
father continued to inspire Relnhold throughout his life for, 
unlike many of his contemporaries of a later age, and like his 
father, he sought to discover the relevance of the Faith to 
history| and near the end of a long career, he could look back 
and say, "I'm glad Insofar as I have adequately exploited the
21Kegley and Bretall, op.eit.. p.3.
22June Bingham, P*59.
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vision of ay father.”23 This vision involved discerning the
point at which the Faith and history, the City of God and the 
City of Man impinged upon each other. The vision was a syn­
thesis derived from th© tension between the two, but it awaited 
a fuller exposition than the father could ever give it. This 
was th® son’s task.
If the mature thought of the elder Niebuhr gave th® 
young man th© tools with which he was ultimately to work, that 
is, "synthesis” and "paradox”, it could not provide him with 
th© subjects upon which he had to work. These were a function 
of his external environment and his response to it. According­
ly, the dichotomy (thesis and antithesis) to b® resolved may 
be seen in th© successive Idealistic and Realistic phases which 
marked his first forty years and which developed out of Nie­
buhr* s contact with American society of th© early Twentieth 
Century, in Its intellectual climate and economic conditions.
It is understandable that his first phase was Idealist.
Relnhold Niebuhr grew up in the America of the turn of 
the Century —  th© America which was in the midst of an extended 
period of prosperity and expansion, and which, remaining aloof 
from foreign entanglements, was left to pursue its Manifest 1 
Destiny as it saw fit. As H.-C. Rohrbach states?
It was a proud age, filled with the conviction 
that democracy made men good, and that those new 
sciences —  psychology and sociology —  would 
overcome man’s evil Inclinations, once so dan-
23MCcall’s, op^ cife., p. 17 1.
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gerous, much as the machine had yoked the 
mountains and spanned th® vastness of a 
continent. Sod remained of interest only 
as someone who had presumably arranged every­
thing so well that America had come to be 
'God's Country'. 2*+
This was American liberalism —  a rising optimism about man, 
derived from this new mystique of democracy, from the new op­
portunity of those prosperous times, from a new humanism, and 
not least, from a romantic faith in the Innocence and self- 
reliance of the 'chosen' country —  America. Niebuhr later 
(how much later and why, will become clearer afterwards) reduced 
this liberal climate to a set of propositions*
a. That injustice is caused by ignorance and will
yield to education and greater Intelligence.
b. That civilisation is becoming gradually more
moral and that it is a sin to challenge 
either the Inevitability or the efficacy 
of gradualness*
c. That the character of individuals rather than
social systems and arrangements is the 
guarantee of justice in society.
d. That appeals to love, justice, good-will and
brotherhood are bound to be efficacious 
in the end. If they have not been so to 
date we mast have more appeals to love, 
justice, good-will and brotherhood.
®. That goodness makes for happiness and that 
increasing knowledge of this fact will 
overcome human selfishness and greed, 
f. That wars are stupid and can therefore only 
be caused by people who are more stupid 
than those who recognize the stupidity 
of war* 25
While this no doubt expressed the atmosphere of American
2lfH.-e. Rohrbach, "Reinhold Niebuhr", in Theologians of 
MlLliJlib Notre Dame, 196**, p.79*
2 R^. Niebuhr. "The Blindness of Liberalism", Radical 
Religion. Autumn 193o, as cited in Arthur Schlesinger*s article 
in Keglay and Bretall, op.cit.. pp.130-1.
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liberalism, it by no means expressed the attitudes of its most 
violent adherents in Protestantism. At the same time as Nie­
buhr was coming under the influence of this liberalism, an ef­
fort was being made to rescue Nineteenth Century Protestantism 
from its individualistic and reactionary pose and restore some 
form of contact with the working classes. This took the form 
of what was called the Social Gospel.
After the Pirst World War, Social Gospellsm preached 
that the Kingdom of God could be realized on earth, within His­
tory as it were, through the efforts of a dedicated working 
class. It was conceived that the Christian ethic was directly 
applicable to social and political questions so that all one 
had to ask oneself was "What would Jesus do?" and one would 
have the key to unlock questions of secular policies in specific 
situations. Thus Christianity was not only a transcendent re­
ligion preaching ultimate judgment and repentance? properly in­
terpreted, it was also a source of Immediate answers to such 
varied problems as foreign policy, farm policy, fiscal policy, 
and wage-guldelines for workers in the turnip-waxing industry. 
This was the democratic idealism of American liberalism boul- 
stered with a religious sanction. For those who felt no need 
of such a sanction, the ideas of John Dewey were sufficient un­
to themselves.
While it is not maintained that at one point Niebuhr was 
prepared to argue for the above-listed Social Gospel formulae, 
they nevertheless became of fundamental importance to Niebuhr’s 
intellectual development. At the time these doctrines were be­
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ing promulgated, he had been content In his tacit liberal as­
sumptions, never feeling the need of questioning in his own 
mind the validity of such a position. However, with his appoint­
ment as minister of Bethel Evangelical Church in Detroit, and 
the resultant first encounter with life in a huge industrial 
metropolis, he soon found himself spiritually and intellectually 
unprepared for what lay before him. As he said himself:
In my parish duties I found that the simple 
idealism into which the classical faith had 
evaporated was as irrelevant to the crises of 
personal life as it was to the complex social 
Issues of an industrial city. 26
The first blows struck against this ’simple idealism’ were di­
rected against its most vocal advocates in its most blatant 
form —  the Social Gospel. It was only later that Niebuhr was 
able to recognize the liberal underpinnings and thereby include 
himself in the indictment. However it was through attacking 
the exaggerated pose of the Social Gospel that Niebuhr finally 
emerged from his Idealist shell In 1927.
After an Initial period of bitter disillusionment, Nie­
buhr proceeded to hammer out, literally on paper, the political 
orientation and the theological position that would succeed 
where his ’simple idealism’ had failed. Throughout the Depres­
sion, up to 1936 in fact, he flirted with various forms of pac­
ifism and Marxism, (substituting in effect a secular Idealism -■ 
for a milder religious one): and then periodically took It all 
back when he discovered that these palliatives could not relate
2%egley and Bretall, ou.cit., p.6 .
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to th® malaise of modern society. This was his Realist period 
which began with his first book. Does Civilization Reed Reli­
gion? (1927) and ended with the publication of Beyond Tragedy 
€ 1936)* In between he wrote Leaves From th® Notebook of a
lamed Cynic (1929),  Sffi&llJlgiat,
(1932), Moral Man and lmmoral Society (1932),
the ind of an.JBrs (193*0, and A&ilit8
Ethics. (1935), all of which were published in New fork.
In order to understand what was happening to Niebuhr at 
this time, it is necessary to realise that if he might be con­
sidered to be a child of American Nineteenth Century Liberalism 
on the one hand, on th® other he was also a child of Nilllam 
James* pragmatic revolt. As Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., points 
out, Niebuhr is an instinctive empiricist with sharp political 
intuitions as well as an instinct for realism. His first re­
action to any problem has always been as a pragmatist, not as a
moralists witness the fact that he was able to discover that the 
answer to the plight of automobile workers in his own parish, 
lay not in some benign optimism, but in a direct program of 
political and social action involving the us® of the stuff of 
which politics is mad® - power* Schlesinger continues the com­
parison with James in th® following wordss
H® shared with William James a vivid sense of 
th® universe as open and unfinished ....Where 
James called it a 'pluralist universe*, Niebuhr 
would call it a ’dynamic universe'} but the 
sense of reality as untamed, streaming, provi­
sional, was vital for both. Similarly both 
revolted against the notion that this unpre­
dictable universe could be caught and contained
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In any closed philosophical system.
Detroit had left its mark. Mo longer could Niebuhr 
rest content with the simple little moral homilies that were 
so obviously irrelevant to the brutal facts of industrial life* 
no longer could he preach a religion cut off from the realities 
of this world by its own closed philosophical system. What 
liberal Protestantism gained by its consistent world view, it 
lost in its distortion of the history of man, for as he said, 
"The universe is simply not the beautiful Greek tempi© pictured 
in th© philosophy of th® absolutists and the monists."2  ^ Sci­
entific intelligence (reference to Dewey) and moral piety (ref­
erence to the Social Gospel) he stated, could not abolish so­
cial conflict} and those who would stake all on rational and 
moralistic methods were ignoring th© limitations in human na­
ture which must finally frustrate their efforts. In other 
words, the realm of love was in one place and the realm of 
power was somewhere else again. Like James, Niebuhr was faced 
with a world of antinomies} a world that simply refused to re­
solve Itself into unity.
Thus it was that Niebuhr came to intellectual maturity 
under the Influence both of liberal Protestantism (Idealism) 
and pragmatism (Realism). His first years were occupied with 
his battle against the former with all the weapons at the dis­
posal of the latter. It is characteristic of Niebuhr that he
27lbld.■ p.131.
28iild., p.13 2.
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than decided to reverse the flow la an attempt to restate la a 
constructive way the relation of ethics to politics.
Without escaping the influence of either liberal Prot­
estantism or pragmatism, Niebuhr was beginning to tire of the 
excesses of both. What the then contemporary Christianity (and 
particularly the Social Gospel) in America lacked was what 
might be phrased, a "sense of the relative"* What pragmatism 
lacked was a "sens® of the absolute". Yet to Niebuhr there 
continued to be value in each position, so neither could be 
completely discarded. He set about the task of salvaging what 
was useful in each by writing An Interpretation of Christian 
Ithlcs in 1935 —  a work which must stand as a cornerstone to 
his attempts to achieve a synthesis of the two streams of 
thought. It was that famous chapter entitled, "The Relevance 
of an Impossible Ethical Ideal" more than anything else that 
demonstrated conclusively that the period of the Realist crit­
ique was drawing to a close. More than that, however; in it 
were to be found the major themes that would interest Niebuhr 
for the rest of his life. For the first time he was a theolo­
gian; still he was a political scientist; but what was important 
was that he could be both at the same time. Here one also sees 
for the first time Niebuhr’s existentialism woven out of "para­
dox", "original sin", and "agape", combining the Idealism of 
the Christian gospel to save man from pessimism and complacency, 
and the Realism both of pragmatism and of Niebuhr’s own view of 
Christian faith to save man fro® sentimentality. It is impor­
tant however, to insist upon the fact that while the concent
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itself was a synthesl s, it rested, in its mechanics on the main­
tenance of a tension between Realism and Idealism. In other 
words he was still prepared to defend the line between prag­
matism and faith —  a line designed to keep the absolute out 
of the relative, the relative out of the absolute, and still 
allow for the final judgment of a transcendental ethic. Schle- 
slnger phrases it this ways
The penetrating critic of the Social Gospel 
and of pragmatism, he ended up, in a sense, 
the powerful reinterpreter and champion of 
both. It was the triumph of his own remark­
able analysis that it took what was valuable 
in each, rescued each by defining for each 
the limits of validity, and, in the end, gave 
the essential purposes of both new power and 
new vitality. 29
These themes were all born at various stages between the 
years 1913 and 193 »^ yet it was not until 1935 that a balance 
between them was contemplated. t$hat was sketched out in 
Interpretation of. Christian Jthtcs had to be refined and de­
veloped, both In its theological and political implications, 
and this was undertaken in the following year in Beyond Trag­
edy. With this book he at last achieved what perhaps he had 
been searching for since his Detroit ministry —  a means of of­
fending almost everybody in one volume. Mot only did the vio­
lent adherents of liberalism and pragmatism have to bear the 
weight of his polemic, but in attempting the balance he preached, 
within the historic Hebraic-Christian faith, he also subjected 
traditional orthodoxy to a close scrutiny and found it wanting.
In its liberalisation into dogma of the Bible MmythaM, tradl-
29Ibld.. p.1^9 .
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tional orthodoxy had created two discrete levels of being (the 
eternal and the temporal), and had destroyed the dialectical 
relationship between them. Failing to perceive that "myth” 
cannot speak of the trans-historical without using symbols and 
events in history as its forms of expression, the Litaralists 
must invariably falsify the facts of history and do irreparable 
damage to any concept of history in eternity.3° Niebuhr went 
on to support the contention that the cradle of science is sur­
rounded by the bodies of strangled theologians (Hercules and 
the serpents) —  a phenomenon also attributed to Llteralist 
obfuscation of the history - eternity relationship.
The significant fact is that Niebuhr had cleared the 
stage of all the actors* Marxists, secular liberals, Protestant 
liberals, pragmatists, pietistic fundamentalists, conservative 
traditionalists, and Greek naturalists in order to proceed to­
ward his own formulation of that Christian faith which alone 
could maintain the dialectical tension with the secular world.
In a phrase, his ultimate task has been to put Christian realism 
at the service of a polities of justice —  the words "Christian" 
and 11 justice"1 counterpoised against the words "realism” and 
"politics” .31 Prior to that task he had to discover that Chris­
tian faith. What he finally created was a theological position 
fully capable of supporting the whole of the Western intellec-
3°Ihls particular phraseology is taken from his orig­
inal sketch in to » P-23
(S.C.M. 19^8 edition).
^McCall's, gp.,„.sjList P-166.
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tual tradition, yet flexible enough to encompass modern real­
ities.
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CHAPTER III
THE MATURE OF MAM, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY
L’homme n’est qu’un roseau, 1® plus 
faibl® d® la nature $ mais c’est un roseau 
peasant.
PASCAL, Pens®®s. vi. 3*f7.
’'Man. has always been his most vexing problem. How shall 
he think of himself?” Thus begins R®inhold Niebuhr’s summa
SisslMisa*
No doubt, in presenting the thought of this great teach­
er, all of Niebuhr’s reviewers have had to wrestle with the 
problem of whether to deal with his theology (Logos) first, and 
then his concept of man (Nous), or whether to reverse the or­
der. That is, insofar as it is Important in discussing any 
thinker, to understand which attitudes are derived from which, 
this sequential symbolism attains a level of meaning transcend­
ing mere literary style. Is Niebuhr’s God derived from Nie­
buhr’s man, or vice-versa? It must suffice to say that Niebuhr 
countenances no such distinction as far as derivation is con­
cerned. Indeed to do so would lay him open to the charge of 
having short-changed one or the other, and while Niebuhr prides 
himself on his "realism” in his concept of man, it would be dif­
ficult for him to admit that he has thereby rendered God a lit-
^Niebuhr, Tiaejfatare and Destiny of Man. New York, 19^9* 
vol. 1 , p.l.
**6
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tl© less exalted, thus there is nothing essentially un-Niebuhr- 
ian in opting for either order and as such, nothing sinister is 
necessarily implied in the order of Chapters III and IV as it 
stands.
But it is important to remain aware of what is implied 
by the lack of implication in this question of order. This is 
the symbol of Niebuhr's claim. He would argue that an excessive 
realism which defines Sod and then finds man wanting (or per­
haps thereby finds man wanting) Is no more eminently to be de­
sired than an excessive idealism which first defines man and 
thereby either derives a set of "inferior" (in Niebuhr's opin­
ion) values, or defines man so that he may be in greater accord 
with values to which Niebuhr would be more agreeable.
There is no way that one can deal with this claim at 
this time without projecting the present study into a discus­
sion of Niebuhr's ©pistemology (for the record, he has none: 
he just starts knowing). Whether Niebuhr's ultimate religious 
principles furnish the web Into which is woven his dialectical 
approach to the nature of man and the course of history, or 
whether his concept of man and history necessitates his reli­
gious first principles is a matter which reasonable men may 
continue to debate, even if Niebuhr himself does not partici­
pate in it.
However, Insofar as it bears on the presentation of 
this thesis, the problem of whether to deal with Logos or Nous 
first is resolved in favour of the latter for two reasons. In 
the preceding definitions of Realism and Idealism, "man, poli­
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tics, and society" constituted the initial variable in the equa­
tion. And as Niebuhr himself chose to begin his greatest work 
with the "problem" of man, the sequence suggests itself. Ac­
cordingly, the initial discussion will concern Niebuhr’s vision 
of historical political existence.
The importance of the question which opened this chap­
ter is not to be gainsaid. It is clearly unrestricted in its 
scop® for it entails an analysis of the constitution of man’s 
humanum in all its complexity: it requires an exploration of 
the mysterious dimensions of that human being which composes 
man in his existence and his essence. It therefore follows 
that Niebuhr’s answer to this question will contain the core 
of his entire thought, insofar as that answer is on® aspect of 
an Absolut® Reality, and of course will provide the controlling 
principle of his political "system”. Thus the relevance of 
this answer to the categories of Realism and Idealism will be 
obvious, even if fitting it into on® of those categories is 
another matter.
The problem was, in Niebuhr’s own words, to find a 
philosophy of human nature and destiny
... which would reach farther into the heights 
and depths of life than the medieval synthesisj 
and would yet be immune to the alternate moods 
of pessimism and optimism, of cynicism and of 
sentimentality to which modem culture is now 
so prone. 2
To Niebuhr, the great danger which all systems have courted 
2ibld.« vol.2 , p.15 6.
UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR LIBRARY
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has lain in the tendency to collapse the full measure of man 
into some simplistic formula which would overstress either 
man's uniqueness and dignity or his affinity with the world 
of nature and his misery. The result has always heen a fatu­
ous Irrelevance to the real complexity of the issue, an ir­
relevance which demonstrated itself in the pendulum swing be­
tween Illusion and disillusion. Nine out of every ten pages 
in any of his works are devoted to demonstrating this irrele­
vance, a fact which has given much of his writing a polemical 
turn. The tenth page has contained Niebuhr's own answer, one 
that has been worked and reworked countless times. While the 
style may change, the theme remains. It is his signature tune. 
As such, the difficulty is not in finding where it is expressed 
but where it is most eloquently expressed. One wonders wheth­
er it has ever been stated better than the way he presented it 
in the Gifford Lectures*
The obvious fact is that man is a child of na­
ture, subject to its vicissitudes, compelled 
by its necessities, driven by its impulses, and 
confined within the brevity of the years which 
nature permits its varied organic form, allowing 
them some, but not too much latitude. The other 
less obvious fact is that man is a spirit who 
stands outside of nature, life, himself, his 
reason and the world, 3
This is Niebuhr at his best —  affirming and denying in the
same breath. Paul Tillich once suggested, rather charitably,
that this has been due to a "predilection for paradoxical lan-
3jbid,. vol. 1 , p.3 .
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guage,,lf: others have been less kind, notably Morton White who 
accuses Niebuhr of "voluntarily abandoning logic".5 it does 
remain open to doubt whether this device is in fact true "par­
adox" even If Niebuhr himself considers it such, but It is 
clear that his estimate of man is dialectical. The essential 
character of human existence is ambiguity* Unfortunately, 
without a certain amount of explanation, Niebuhr's insight 
into man seems endowed with similar characteristics.
Hiebuhrian man is basically a dual creature, that is, 
a creature with a dual nature. Though these two aspects may 
be separated analytically, embodied man forever 'combines' them 
and is, in fact, the result of the tension between them. As 
throughout all of Niebuhr's thought, tension is the operative 
word here —  truth for Niebuhr consists in the tension main- 
talned between two dialectical opposites —  and any assessment 
of man must grasp the necessity of and express this tension. 
Thus any single affirmation which man makes about himself in­
volves him in contradictions. If he wishes to stress his own 
unique and rational qualities, then his own greed and lust for 
power bear witness against him* If he asserts that men every­
where are merely the product of nature and are unable to rise 
above contingent circumstances, he is ignoring man the creature
k
See Paul Tillich, "Reinhold Niebuhr's Doctrine of 
Knowledge", Kegley and Bretall, on.clt., p.39, Dr. Tillich 
argues very cogently that Niebuhr confuses "paradox" and "dia­
lectic" , sometimes mistaking one for the other. Tillich does 
admit that both elements are present in Niebuhr's work.
^Morton White, Social ThoughtIn America. Boston, 1959, 
pp.263 and 26*+.
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who dreams of Sod and aspires to male® himself God, not to men­
tion the on© whose sympathy with the condition of his fallows 
knows no hounds. If ha credits man as being essentially good 
and attributes all evil to concrete historical and social 
causes, he merely begs the question —  of what are these causes 
the consequence? If he discovers man to be bereft of all vir­
tue, his own capacity for reaching such a Judgment refutes the 
terms of his judgment.
Such baffling paradoxes of human self-knowledge reveal 
the vexing problem of doing justice to one or the other aspects 
of man's duality. Only a theory inspired by a knowledge of 
both qualities can be considered to be adequate.
Thus throughout history Niebuhr says, human life has 
incorporated and will continue to incorporate a standing para­
dox, Relying at many points on Kierkegaard, Niebuhr begins by 
asserting that man is both creature and creator, made in the « 
Image of God and yet finite, caught in the necessities of na­
ture and yet able to transcend them. Man is mortal, but can 
look beyond his own deathf limited, but able to see beyond his 
limitations. Niebuhrian man constantly finds himself at aua 
intermediary point between the world of nature and the world 
of spiritj and while he is a part of nature and history (note 
the separation of the two6), in the indeterminate scope of his 
freedom, he is able to stand outside the forces of nature and
6"The freedom of the human spirit over the natural = 
process makes history possible." Niebuhr, The Children of 
hlght and., the. Children of Darkness. og,cit,, p,*»9.
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harness them to his will.7 Similarly he transcends concrete 
historical circumstances while at the same time being a prod­
uct of them. Above all, man transcends himself. Thus he is 
capable of making himself the object of his own knowledge, 
for good or ill, for insight or delusion.
Man, no matter how hard he tries, cannot entirely 
escape his circumstances, his parochial outlook, and his ego­
tistic self. There will always be an element of assertive 
egocentrism even in his highest flights of altruism; and it is 
precisely Whan he claims that he Is being most objective that 
man inserts something personal, self-enclosed and partisan in­
to his thought, Man cannot hold any point of view which is 
not relative, nor ean he have anything but a limited grasp of 
perfection.
And yet, despite the fact that man is the captive of 
such necessities, he is also free. He does know that there is 
a perfection beyond his grasp. He does have the capacity to 
see beyond his local circumstances, recognize that some other 
point of view is possible, and believe that there is such a
?Io give an example of the repetitiveness with which 
•homo Niebuhrensis' is discussed, a random sampling of some of 
the source material for these statements is as followsa
Moral. Man. ..and. Immoral.Soclety. op.eit,, pp.2,3,25,29.
  2Li?&Etofcg.Sb p-u.-c.it..
pp.6 ,4>9,53-55,15^,187.
pp.*+-7,71-77,155,
167-70.
Christian Realism .and...P.ol.ltieal Problems, on._clt.. pp.5-7,39,
ff7"ioi7x59 i7§,i^;
Ptons_and Secular .America, QP.clt., pp.127-32,135-38.
The^Stjnicture of Nations and Empires. o£^£it•, pp.7,^0-1,
105-07,287-90,298-99.
Mania Ja.tu.re. and His Communities, on.olt., pp.30-33,S2-*+,106- 
09,116,1.2^ 7
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thing as impersonality and objectivity.
Again, Niebuhr phrases it best*
In the words of Pascal, the 'dignity of man and 
his misery' have the same source. Man stands 
perpetually outside and beyond every social, 
natural, communal, and rational cohesion. He is 
not bound by any of them, which makes for his 
creativity. He is tempted to make us® of all 
of them for his own ends? that is the basis of 
his destructiveness. One may go further and 
declare that the limitless character of man’s 
ideals of perfection and the inordinacy of hu­
man lusts and ambitions have their common root 
in the capacity of man to stand out of, and 
survey, any historical or natural situation which 
surrounds him. 8
Briefly, man is a creature living tensely between two 
worlds or conditions* one is the actual, limited world in which 
he must operate from day to day but from which he feels in some 
way, however slightly, alienated. The other is an ideal world 
which, though he sees it but through the darkness of his vi­
sion, is one for which he longs but from which he is permanent­
ly excluded. Thus it is the common and eternal fate of all 
men that they share the role of the disappointed Idealist, for 
man's nature is such that he must seek after an impossible vic­
tory knowing full well that he will eventually have to adjust 
himself to inevitable defeat.
The consequence of this, Niebuhr claims, is that man
experiences one basic and defining emotion —  anxiety —  that
psychological source of all great human achievements. Anxiety i 
shows Itself in man's perennial sense of dissatisfaction and
C^hristian leallam and Political Problems. P-&*
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Is a direct product of his knowledge of M s  own ambiguous and 
contradictory position at the juncture of freedom and finite- 
ness, of spirit and nature. It is the result of man’s futile 
efforts to escape the demands of nature on the one hand, or of 
the spirit on the other| yet it at the same time goads him in­
to continuing to try to escape from flnitude to infinity, to 
try to be God rather than to subject himself to the will of 
God„9
Thus is anxiety the source of man’s sinfulness. It 
should be made perfectly clear at the outset that anxiety Is 
not itself sin; it is merely the precondition of sin in which 
man attempts to make himself the basis of his own security or 
to escape the awful paradox of his own nature. Han thus sinks 
into sensuality or loses himself in fanaticism, he tries des­
perately to identify his own limited and relative powers with 
the Absolute. But while anxiety produces all this, it does not 
make sin logically necessary, for it must be remembered that 
sin is committed in freedom. And if sin is committed in free­
dom, it therefore follows that it cannot be attributed to a 
defect in man’s essence. This is original sin —  that much- 
abused doctrine as badly understood by Christians as anybody —
9»Man is ... anxious because he does not know the limits
of his possibilities.” ,TM,, .ftdami JhtlilflaLfig Ha&t
p.183. Thus anxiety, like frustration, can only pertain to at­
tainable goals. Eventually Niebuhr has to deal with the fact, 
as Browning observed, that man’s reach exceeds his grasp, and 
therefore much turns on Niebuhr’s use of the verb "know”. This 
should not be taken as any criticism of Niebuhr's basic thesis, 
that anxiety is to be understood in its relation to freedom and 
sin —  a thesis which, incidentally, owes much to a similar 
analysis conducted in Kierkegaard’s The Concent of Bread.
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for sin is no more and no less than the Self’s attempt to deny 
its own finitude, to make itself Absolute.
At the risk of causing the reader to wonder whether 
this thesis is becoming an exercise in theological semantics, 
some effort should be made to explain exactly what Niebuhr as­
sociates with the concept of sin In man. This problem is mueh 
more to the point than would appear at the first glance, for 
it is precisely on this basis that all of Niebuhr’s liberal 
critics seek to attack his ease* Morton White comes immediately 
to mind.
Niebuhr’s famous statement on this matter is as follows*
... (E)vll in man is a consequence of his inevi­
table though not necessary unwillingness to 
acknowledge his dependence, to accept his finite- 
ness, and to admit his insecurity. 10
Whit© devotes a paragraph to pretending to explore th© differ­
ence between "inevitable" and "necessary", spends another para­
graph incorrectly explaining what Niebuhr means by the terms, 
and then sums up by accusing Niebuhr of appalling "obscurant­
ism".^ While not the most intelligent of Niebuhr’s liberal 
critics, White’s revulsion at the concept of original sin may 
be regarded as typical —  even if his attack is unique.
Niebuhr admits that th© doctrine of original sin is 
somewhat absurd from th® standpoint of a pure rationalism, for 
th© concept of free will that underlies it seems absurd. Qrlg-
10i a t ] g & . M < l ,M,„H m » voi.i, p.1 5 0.
^Morton White4 oo.cit., pp.261-2.
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Inal sin, which is by definition an "inherited” corruption, in 
the sense that it is inevitable, is emphatically not to be re­
garded as belonging to man's essential nature {in which case 
it would be outside th© realm of his responsibility). Sin is 
"natural” for man in the sense that it is universal only, but 
not in the sens© that it is necessary. Neither is sin to be 
regarded as a pure caprice of man's will.
It proceeds rather from a defect of the will, 
for which reason it is not completely deliberate? 
but since it is the will in which th® defect is 
found and th® will presupposes freedom, th© de­
fect cannot be attributed to a taint in man's 
nature. 12
What is on© to say of free will? Again Niebuhr relies 
heavily on Kierkegaard and Pascal whan he suggests that "neces­
sity” and "contingency” are terms which belong to natural sci­
ence, by whose standards the polarity of freedom and destiny 
in human existence constitutes logical nonsense. Man cannot 
b© free without destiny, nor can he have destiny without free­
dom.*^ Th© doctrine of original sin expresses a relation be-
1%atur.e. and Destiny of Man. op.clt.. p.2^ 2.
^Xbld. pp.2%3 and 263* Pascal statesi "For it is be­
yond doubt that there is nothing which more shocks our reason 
than to say that the sin of the first man has rendered guilty 
those who. being so removed from its source, seem incapable of 
participating in it .... Certainly nothing offends us more 
rudely than this doctrine, and yet without this mystery, the 
most incomprehensible of all, w© are incomprehensible to our­
selves.” imam&t **3**.
Kierkegaard's explanation of th® dialectic relationship 
between freedom and necessity grasps the cor© of the issue* "If 
this contradiction is wrongly understood it leads to false con­
cepts of original sin. Rightly understood it leads to a true
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tv®an fate and freedom which cannot b© fully rationalized, for 
it must do Justice to the fact that self-love and self-centred­
ness in existential man is inevitable, but not in such a way as 
to fit into the category of natural necessity.
Before concluding these remarks on the nature of man, 
perhaps a few ancillary statements should be directed to the 
implications of what has Just been discussed, and in particular 
to the last foot-note, this brief encounter with Niebuhr's 
concept of sin has served several purposes. It has first of 
all established that Niebuhr believes man to be sinful not be­
cause of bad education, mental disease, or unjust social condi­
tions, but because of man's reaction to his own anxiety. It 
has also demonstrated that Niebuhr affixes a constant to human 
activity in a moral dimension, beyond which existential man 
cannot go. Sin is inevitable and will never be exorcised.
Thus there is in man as Niebuhr sees him, a certain perversity 
or discordance that produces disharmony in th® relation of man 
to his community or to the Universe.
But beyond this, beyond the precise attributes that 
Niebuhr ascribes to man’s humanum. there is a significance to
concept, to the idea namely that every individual is itself and 
the race, and that th® later individual is not significantly 
differentiated from the first man. In the possibility of anx­
iety freedom is lost, for It is overwhelmed by fate. Yet now 
it arises in reality, but with an explanation that it has be­
come guilty." T M  Concent of,.,,Bread. p. 105.
More than the preceding analysis of Niebuhr's concept 
of sin, these two quotations embody an essential aspect of Nie­
buhr's thought —  his case against reason when it is used as 
anything more than a technique (reason, in the sense of instru­
mental rationalism).
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his position which distinguishes it from those views of man 
held by various other political philosophers. It lies in th® 
"method of thought" typified by these preceding statements on 
the nature of sin but by no means exhausted by them. The ques­
tion may be phrased this way* what role does reason play in 
the formation of that realm of meaning in which Niebuhr places 
man? It now becomes clear on the one hand that the problem 
of meaning, a basic problem in religious thought, transcends 
the ordinary rational problem of tracing the relation of things 
to each other in th® sense that it must be determined whether 
or not they contradict. On the other hand, Niebuhr seems to 
favour employing reason as a rationalistic pattern in the form 
of a technique. N.J. Wolf adumbrated Niebuhrian dialectical 
analysis in the following manners 1 ) state two opposite facts 
of any human problem, 2 ) reduce each further to negative and 
positive elements, 3 ) correlate th© sub-negation of the basic 
affirmation with the sub-positive of the basic negation, *+) show 
how the Christian answer meets these complexities in the whole­
ness of the problem.^
It must be remembered that there are two sources of 
Niebuhr's insight —  experience and revelations the former, 
for what It is worth, being probably led by the nose by the 
latter. To what extent his view is Christian or Biblical may 
be a matter of no small debate, but the fact remains that Nie­
buhr the mystic does not feel compelled to yield the right of
i^Nllliam John Wolf, "Reinhold Niebuhr's Doctrine of 
Man", Kegley and Bretall, oo.cit., p.231*
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way to Niebuhr the logician.
Formerly there can be, of course, no conflict 
between logic and truth. The laws of logic 
are reason*® guard against chaos in the realm 
of truth. They eliminate contradictory as­
sertions. But there is no resource in logical 
rules to help us understand complex phenomena, 
exhibiting characteristics which seem to re­
quire that they be placed into contradictory 
categories of reason. 15
Such are the epistemological distinctions that must be 
made on Niebuhr's behalf that he has given many th# impression 
that he is an irrational!st. It is this writer's conviction 
that such an impression is wrong, for while Niebuhr may express 
reservations with regard to instrumental rationalism, it by no 
means follows that he makes hash of reason. While reason may 
not have created the paradox, it can entertain the concept with­
out being destroyed. Niebuhr himself likes to quote Max Scholar 
who defined the distinction between reason and meaning as fol­
lows*
A problem of reason would be the followings 
*1 have a pain in my am. Where did it come 
from and how may I be rid of it?' To deter­
mine that is a task of science. But I may 
use the pain in my arm to reflect upon the 
fact that th© world is tainted with pain, 
evil and sorrow. Then I will asks 'What is 
pain, evil, and sorrow essentially, making 
pain as such, without reference to my par­
ticular pain, possible?’ 16
If, in terms of theology, the observable expression of 
anxiety is sin, in politics according to Niebuhr, it is the ^
1^Nature and Destiny of Man. on.cit.« vol.l, p.262.
16Max Scheler, Me,. Stelluni:....Ate Menschen im Kosmas.
p.68 as cited in ibid., p.16*+.
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will-to-power. Anticipating the peril in which he stands, man 
transmutes his natural instinct for survival (his will-to-live) 
into two spiritualized forms. On© form is the desire to ful­
fill the potentialities of life and not merely to maintain its 
existence5 for man, unlike an animal, cannot just live. He is 
driven to seek the realization of his true nature, whatever 
that is. This may be called th© "will-to-self-raalizatlon", 
which is subject to the paradox that in order to be achieved, 
it must be the result of self-giving, but cannot be its intend­
ed consequence.1 -7
The other form is th© desire for power and glory. Anx­
iety issues in pride wherein the human ego assumes its self- 
sufficiency if it can only make itself secure enough| thus 
pride issues in the will-to-power.18 The conflicts between 
men are thus never simple conflicts between competing survival 
impulses, but taka on a spiritualized form and as usual, are 
thereby subject to another paradox —  this time, a tragic par­
adox, It consists in the fact that while it might be assumed 
that those who attain great power have thus conquered insecuri­
ty, the fact is that once embarked on its quest for security, 
there is no point at which the Self can feel satisfied in hav­
ing enough security.^
 iftlMia M i  1 U  £gniljia§) pp.106-7.
l8T.k9.4hlltoiuiC.Mgjit, M A  fiM Itoa »
on.eit.. pp. 18-22. The quintessence of pride Is spiritual 
pride or self-righteousness. In addition to pride of power, 
there is also intellectual and moral pride.
^Thus Hiebuhr criticizes Erich Fromm's belief that the
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This of course loads Niebuhr to that great touchstone 
of Realist political thought, the securlty-and-power dilemma, 
about which little need b© said. His usage of th® concept is 
similar to that of Herz —  both would call it a basic irra­
tionality but a fact in politics.
The most important aspect of this discussion should by 
now be obvious. Niebuhr relates the security-and-power dilem­
ma to the will-to-power, which he relates in turn to anxiety, 
freedom and sin. It is clear that corrective therapy cannot 
eliminate it, nor can tinkering with political and social in­
stitutions, nor can better education. It Is a basic part of 
existential man.
This then is Niebuhr’s anthropology —  his doctrine of 
man. As Kenneth Thompson has observed, in making this the 
centre of his ’system”, Niebuhr has more in common with the 
traditional political philosophers than with many of his pre­
sent day contemporaries. Th© practice of rooting political 
theory In political institutions and processes, rather than 
probing deeper to the level of human nature apparently belongs 
to the last few decades.2^ As Niebuhr’s political thought is 
further explored, ©specially with regard to his criticisms of 
other political theories, the full implications of this central
capacity to love is a ’phenomenon of abundance” of attained
security (  f f i U L > PJUSlt., p. 109).
20Kenneth Thompson, ’The Political Philosophy of Rein­
hold Niebuhr”, Kegley and Brstall, on.cit., p.162-3. He quotes 
Niebuhr as asking* "Is it possible to lead man out of the so­
cial confusion into an ordered society if we do not know man a 
little better than either Marxians or liberals know him?”
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position will become perhaps a little clearer.
Before leaving this exposition of Niebuhr's concept of 
man, it may be of some interest to the reader to discover the 
name by which this concept goes. So far it has been called 
merely "Niebuhr's view of man"* It will already have occurred 
to some readers that it might also be called "the Christian 
view" or "Christian Realism". This is what in fact Niebuhr 
does call it (alternately "the Biblical view" by which he means 
th© Judaio-Christlan heritage), but frequently it is done with­
out any evident precise meaning. It is not even clear how he 
Intends to employ the terms "Christian" or "Christianity" .21 
At various times he wishes to oppose Hebraic to Graeco-Hellen- 
lstic concepts, sometimes he is referring to Protestantism as 
opposed to Catholicism (especially in matters relating to nat­
ural law), most of the time he has in mind a consistent faith 
of some sort which may be distinguished from both classical 
rationalism and Oriental mysticism.
Yet the question remains, is there a consistent Biblical 
view of any one major theological theme, and even if there is, 
is not Niebuhr's interpretation contradicted by many other In­
terpretations that have just as good a claim as his own to con­
stitute th® "Biblical view"? It must be admitted that Niebuhr 
makes a very strong case for a consistent viewpoint, and in 
using it to such advantage as he does, to examine alternative 
systems, Niebuhr makes It appear as if no other Biblical inter-
21fhls is done so frequently that references are proba­
bly needless. See Faith and History. (New York), 19^9, Chaps.
7 and 8 } The Nature and Destiny of Man. vol.l, Chaps. 1 and 5.
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pretatlon could carry on an effective dialogue. However, the 
consistency of the Bible with regard to a particular concept
of man is hardly a point of necessary debate in this thesis.
Similarly, insofar as Niebuhr relies upon the effectiveness 
of a Biblical challenge to th© shortcomings of rival philos­
ophies, to buttress his own claim to Biblical rectitude, the 
argument is of little concern here. Nevertheless, it is of 
direct relevance to examine Niebuhr*s assessment of rival con­
cepts of man and methods of understanding man, if only to de­
termine to what extent Niebuhr is correct in labelling his 
thought "Christian Realism", with the accent on "Realism".
It has already been suggested many times that Niebuhr 
roots his political theory in a concept of human nature, yet 
it has never been fully stated why. It is primarily a question
of the alternative methods which are at the disposal of the
political theorist* Contemporary thought has assumed that the 
proper method for th© study of politics is that which has been 
so successful in the natural or physical world. It has been 
widely claimed that all that separated the physical and social 
sciences has been an unfortunate cultural lag resulting from 
the us© of archaic and imprecise methods by backward and un­
sophisticated social scientists. The techniques of social 
science have lagged far behind those of the natural or labora­
tory sciences and all that theory has needed to develop has 
been the realization that the scientific method is directly 
relevant to the understanding of political phenomena.
Niebuhr * s attitude to the rola of the scientific method
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in this area has hean almost unreservedly critical. Thus he 
has been forced to go in search of an alternative to it. This 
alternative is political philosophy, and political philosophy 
as Niebuhr comprehends it, involves the presentation of an 
interpretation of the meaning of history. This being the case, 
at some point th® political philosopher must make explicit his 
theory of human nature. Thus any understanding of political 
phenomena is inseparable from a clear picture of human nature.
This then is Niebuhr’s first broadside at modern 
thought, and before dealing with alternative concepts to his 
view of human nature, it would seem logical to deal with that. 
His target, what has so far been referred to as the scientific 
method, Niebuhr calls "scientism*4.
Niebuhr's criticism is aimed at the social scientist's 
unqualified trust in th® scientific method and not at its le­
gitimate functions. He would concede for instance that in the 
at times vicious debate between the advocates of free enter­
prise and collectivism, empirical studies of reality are often 
th® only basis for political choice to the extent that these 
studies limit themselves to practical questions such as the 
role of property in an agrarian society as compared to an in­
dustrial society.
But otherwise, th® value of "scientific" studies of 
human behaviour is very questionable, for the scientific ap­
proach to this area of study is based on five tenuous assurap-
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whereas it is In fact Impossible to give form or meaning to 
any social research in th© absence of a framework? 2 ) while 
“science” as empiricism means humility before th© faets, “sci­
ence" as rationalism means th® invoking of logical coherence 
as th© test of truth, which prompts men to deny obvious facts 
if they appear to violate the tenets of coherence? 3 ) it as­
sumes that the social observer is not involved In the reality 
he observes and can operate as pure mind without ideological 
taint, national loyalty or social and economic status affect­
ing his judgment| k) modern conceptions of causation and pre­
diction ignore the complexity of causation and the Intervention 
of contingent factors in history, including the human agent 
(thus the world Is not a repeatable laboratory experiment); 
and 5 ) it believes that science is th© profoundest, because it 
is th© latest, fruit of culture in accordance with Auguste 
Comte's concept of the history of culture as the movement from 
a religious to a metaphysical to a scientific age.2^
The dubious dogmas that inform and strengthen these 
illusions are two, namely, that man can be controlled as a 
piece of nature and that man is infinitely perfectible.2*4. As
 a M  H & ito y t .ffiP.tSi.V, p . 53. and fifagjU iA ia
p.1**
23chrlstlan Realism and Political Problems, o.p., c It. .p. 3.
2*4Possibly one of the better sources for a view of
scientism is afforded by Hoitan P. Odegard's book, Sin and 
Science. Antioch Press, (1956). Two quotations should suf­
fice to present a general pictures
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a pair of assertions supposedly leading to a consistent posi­
tion, one might expect to find them less contradictory, for 
on© is the essence of fatalism and the other is the essence 
of voluntarism. Th® tendency to equate history with nature 
and to confuse the "laws of nature" with those of politics and 
history has given rise to a determinism which minimizes the 
creative role of man. The moat consistent application of this 
determinism is th® economies of laissez fair®, drawn from phys- 
iocratic theory, which warns men not to interfere with the 
"natural" processes and "natural" balances of history. But 
th© tendency to equate history with nature can also inspire a 
contrary voluntarist!® theory according to which man is called 
upon to us® scientific technics to manage history and politics, 
as h© has managed nature. What man can do about the peril of 
th® hydrogen bomb is regarded as equally manageable as the 
physical forces which produced the bomb.2^
The equation is really quit® simple. As long as human 
reason can discern the laws which control the world of nature, 
and as long as there is no difference between nature and his—
"Opposition of freedom to authority, or freedom to or­
der is on® of th® fallacious attitudes men have fallen into 
while floundering around trying to adjust to and understand the 
fdatively new situation of social fluidity .... If organized 
inquiry, the method of operative perfectible knowledge, is ac­
cepted as authoritative, there is a possibility of organically 
uniting freedom and authority, freedom and order, in a way at­
tuned to the fluctuating times." (p.1^2 )
"A theorist is a thinker who, when he finds that his 
problems are 'insoluble1, questions the problems and tries to 
reformulate them so that they can be solved." (p.165)
Affierlcan..H.i,story, g.p.^ it., pp.80-1.
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tory, than human reason can ultimately manage politics and 
history. If modem man cannot determine whether he shall under­
stand himself from the standpoint of the uniqueness of his 
reason or from the standpoint of his affinity with nature, 
scientism says that it does not matter, for that human reason 
allows him unlimited control over his position in nature. The 
deficiency of both liberal and Marxist theory is just this 
tendency to see man merely fro® this viewpoint of modern nat­
uralistic rationalism*
This surely is a too simple and premature solution, but 
it is typical of modern man in his naive optimism. Secure in 
his neat certainties about himself, he has destroyed the ten­
sion between finitud© and freedom in his nature, in favour of 
the latter. As a result, nothing stands in the way of unlimited 
progress in history and man can perfect himself.
Consequently, the idea that man is sinful at the very 
centre of his personality, that is, in his will, is thereby 
universally rejected. It is this rejection which has seemed 
to make the Christian gospel simply irrelevant to modern man, 
a fact which is of much more importance than any conviction 
about its incredibility. The idea of modern liberalism that 
there is progress in history, the belief in the indefinite 
perfectibility of man, represents the most systematic effort 
in all of human history to get around the fact of sin and to 
deny that man is a limited and finite creature. This is the 
very principle of sin —  the attempt to deny it —  converted
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outlook that can deal with the real world. These are the 
children of light who ”... are usually foolish because they do 
not know the power of self-will.”26 This sentimental delusion 
about the nature of man and history is responsible for the 
follies, self-deceptions, and arrogant hopes on which the 
modern era has at times foundered disastrously. The belief in 
the natural goodness and malleability of man explains why mod­
ern liberals were so late in recognising the true nature of 
Fascism. The idea that evil is social in its origins and can 
be eliminated by social engineering explains why so many have 
been seduced by Communism. The concept that when man progres­
ses in knowledge he also progresses in virtue explains why 
modern society has had a manic-depressive character, moving 
from bouts of utopian enthusiasm at one extreme to bouts of 
cynical disillusion and despair at the other. With such blind 
faith in human nature and human reason, the only word that can 
describe liberalism is ’benign*.
What the children of light have dispensed with in their 
sentimentality is that sine qua non of all politics —  power. 
Liberalism Insists that justice can be maintained through the 
working of a free economic system, that a simple social harmony 
can be achieved by a "cool prudence and a calculating egotism" 
—  in short it has failed to relate the individual organically
26?he Children of Light and the Children of Darkness. 
.QP.t.Sl,t., p.11.
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to society.2? In analyzing the relationship between nations 
and the international community again modern liberal culture 
has shown its sentimentality in its universails® and faith in 
the growth of law.2®
In this manner, Niebuhr introduces the second touch­
stone of Realist political thought —  the necessity of power 
in social relationships. Here to Niebuhr lay the value of 
Marxism, for Marxism while still being part of the heritage of 
the children of light in terms of its illusions about the na­
ture of history, had come to terms with power. While liberal­
ism sought to solve the great problem of justice In society by 
asking people to be more kind and loving, Marxism knew that 
justice cannot be established without a struggle in which the 
Interests of the victims of injustice are set against those 
of the beneficiaries of injustice.
But Marxism errs on two counts: In the first place, to 
Niebuhr, the Illusion that the classless society will eliminate 
the problem of power is as utopian as the sentimentality of 
liberalism. In the second place, disproportions of power any­
where in the human community are sources of injustice. The 
power monopoly of a class becomes the monopoly of the party 
which claims to be the vanguard of the whole class: the monop­
oly of the party gradually becomes the monopoly of a small 
oligarchy, and then the dictatorship of the oligarchy further
27jiia., P.3 1.
28iMd-t pp.33-^1.
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degenerates into the dictatorship of a single tyrant. Thus 
some type of distributive balance of power Must be achieved. 
Herein lies the third touchstone of Realist political thought - 
the counterbalancing of interests to secure a reasonable Justice 
in lieu of any more satisfactory arrangement.
These twin problems of power —  the perennial neces­
sity of it in social relationships, and the prevention of its 
being accumulated by on® group —  constitute the essential mes­
sage of Moral Man and Immoral Society. Individuals, he argues, 
qua individuals, may have lofty sentiments and noble inten­
tions? they may in personal relationships do commendable work 
which Is a benefit to the community. But collective man —  
man as he acts through classes, races, nations, parties —  is 
basically '‘immoral*’. The struggle among any associations of 
human beings is essentially a matter of power rather than mo­
rality.
It may be possible, though it is never easy, 
to establish Just relations between individuals 
within a group purely by moral and rational 
suasion and accomodation. In inter-group 
relations this is practically an impossibility.
The relations between groups must therefore 
always be predominantly political rather than 
ethical ... • 3^
v 29SAris.tlan Realism and Political Problems. oa.cit. * 
pp.33-^ 2.
 S q&Xm aiu,gA$,«> pp.xxii -
xxlii. Niebuhr would agree with Robert Osgood’s statement of 
this problem* "A citizen's dependence upon his nation assumes 
a distinct Intimacy because ha confers upon the object of his 
allegiance the attributes of a person so closely identified 
with his own personality that he virtually acquires a second 
self, in whose behalf he can feel friendly, hostile, generous, 
selfish, confident, afraid, proud, or humiliated almost as
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Furthermore, the natural egotism of such association of human 
beings is so great that a tolerable justice can only be a- 
chieved by guaranteeing to each group enough power to counter­
balance that of other groups by which it might be exploited.3^
This balance of power Niebuhr calls "managed anarchy", 
for when not consciously manipulated, it does not develop into 
a perfect equilibrium and anarchy invariably overcomes the 
management in the end. It is clear that Niebuhr is quite pre­
pared to distinguish between national and international sys­
tems, for the manipulator he has in mind is the force of gov­
ernment.-^ 2
Since there is no power of government transcending the 
conflicts of nations which might be able to arbitrate the 
struggle from an impartial perspective, whatever order is a- 
chleved in international society stems from the imposition of 
preponderant power by on® or more of the interested partici­
pants. When this Is coupled with the fact that the group, 
according to Niebuhr, is more arrogant, hypocritical, self-
polgnantly as he would feel these emotions for himself in his 
relations with other individuals. However, the conscience of 
this vicarious personality* unlike the private conscience, is 
relieved by the sanction of patriotism, so that a citizen can 
manage with a sense of complete moral consistency to combine 
lofty altruism toward his own nation with extreme egoism to­
ward other nations and thereby actively support a standard of 
ethics in foreign relations which he would not dream of tol­
erating in his private dealings.” (Ideals and Self-Interest in 
America's Foreign Relations, op.clt.. p.11.5
Qp„,ci,t.., pp.8 ff,ll>+ ff.
32Tfa® Children of Light and the Children of Darkness, 
op.clt** p.171**
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centred and more ruthless in the pursuit of its ends than the
individual, the best that can be expected of them is that
they should Justify their hypocricies by a slight measure of
real international achievement and attempt to do Justice to
wider interests than their own, while they pursue their o w n .33
The question then, at this point surely is, why is
there no international government? Niebuhr rests his entire
case on two major points: that governments are not simply
created by flat, and that governments are evidence of but do
not create community. No group of individuals, he argues,
has ever created either government or community out of whole
cloth. Furthermore, the community, in at least inchoate form,
is prior to its laws, and the authority of government is pri­
on
marily the authority of the community itself.J
In this manner does Niebuhr deal with the arguments 
of the stupid children of light who have correctly perceived 
the need of bringing individual and group interests into a
3%oral Man and Immoral Society, op.clt.. p.108.
3^ Chrlstlan Realism and Political Problems, op.clt.. 
pp.17-22. But there is tension in even this analysis. To cut 
man’s achievements off at this point would be to accentuate 
his finiteness at the expense of his indeterminate freedom.
Thus Niebuhr is required to add:
"To call attention to this fact does not mean that all 
striving for a higher and wider integration of the world com­
munity is vain. That task must and will engage the conscience 
of mankind for ages to come. But the edifice of government 
which we build will be sound and useful if its height is pro­
portionate to the strength of the materials from which it is 
constructed." Ibid., p.29.
Even so, it will be noticed that Niebuhr has not denied 
that there are limits. His genius appears to consist in the 
fact that he consistently refuses to specify them short of say­
ing that man cannot achieve the ultimate.
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working harmony for the sake of total community by their in- 
ternationalistic aspirations, but have failed to understand 
how difficult of hop© are these realisations. Similarly h© 
has refuted the position of those who would hold out optimis­
tic prospects for a perfect Justice in domestic society. And 
of course, he has done the same thing to the argument that 
man himself is perfectible. To Niebuhr it is significant 
that he has had to do this? that his battles have been with 
the children of light, the sentimentalists, rather than with 
the children of darkness, the moral cynics. Human history is 
the record of man's recurrent efforts to overstep the bounds 
which have been set upon his existence, and what happens in 
history is an ironic comment on this human pretension. For 
Niebuhr, the great events of history —  the rise and fall of 
social institutions, the breakdown of old social classes and 
the emergence of new ones, the revolutions and wars, the great 
hopes with which social movements begin and the great disap­
pointments with which they end —  are neither episodes in a 
meaningless cycle of birth and decay (Greek naturalism), nor 
agents in the progressive realisation of truth and goodness 
(modern liberalism). They are testaments in history to the 
Judgment of the Absolut®, they are witnesses to the fact that 
men strive for a fulfillment in history which is not there. 1 
When man fails to see that this Absolute stands irretrievably 
above and outside history, he commits the sin of pride and acts 
as though the ends he seeks in history are absolute and final. 
This increases his anxiety.
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To many, such an outlook appears permeated with pes­
simism. Everywhere it seems, Niebuhr lays down limits beyond 
which man cannot pass and to this extent it must be stated 
that Niebuhr is a Realist.
But he is also a Christian realist. He has drawn a 
picture of man as limited and free, as aware for the most part 
that he lives and acts under a norm that transcends the real­
ities with which he must deal. In order to do justice to his 
own tension, he must establish some relevance between that 
transcendent norm and historical actuality. The question of 
how Niebuhr relates the two, as well as the questions of the 
significance of all these limitations on man In practical terms, 
and the nature of the norm, will be the subject of the follow­
ing discussion.
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CHAPTER I?
THE ABSOLUTE AND NIEBUHR’S RATIONAL 
AND MORAL ORDER 
Audi partem alteram.
ST. AUGUSTINS, De Duabus Animabus. XIV. ii.
The order of the terms which constitute the definitions 
of Political Realism and Political Idealism outlined in Chapter 
I would seem to require that the following discussion concern 
itself solely with Niebuhr’s Logos (ultimate principles from 
which Is derived his rational and moral order) per se, leaving 
to a concluding chapter any discussion of the relationship be­
tween that Logos and the nous described in Chapter III. That 
is to say, consistency with the ’’equation" necessitates ab­
stracting Niebuhr’s Absolute for the purposes of analysis, all 
the while avoiding the temptation of drifting into any discus­
sion of that Absolute’s meaning (id est. relevance). In theo­
logical terms, this involves taking apart the Trinity to dis­
cuss God the Father (the God who does not enter history) with­
out any reference to God the Son (the God of history) or the
relationship between the two. Or perhaps more significantly, 
it is the Civitas Dei as opposed to the Civitas Terrana. to 
put it in Augustinian terms.
75
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It may seem somewhat risible, not to say pointless, to 
enclose this aspect of Niebuhr’s thought in one ludicrously 
short chapter. The explanation is that while Niebuhr devotes 
virtually no time and no effort to describing the nature of 
his Absolute and its ideal society in isolation, (preferring 
rather to discuss it in relation to the temporal world), and 
consequently leaves one with little to say that is not St. 
Augustine’s Kingdom of Heaven warmed over, it is Important 
that this thesis distinguish markedly the two variables in 
the Realist-Idealist definitions, especially in applying them 
to Niebuhr who, it must be remembered, attempts to transcend 
both. Accordingly, to avoid confusion, this chapter will deal 
exclusively with a brief summary of Niebuhr's rational and 
moral order.**"
Niebuhr describes his Heavenly City in the following
manner:
3-11 must be admitted before proceeding any further, 
that this particular device of abstracting Niebuhr’s moral or­
der to avoid reference to the temporal order, is most definit­
ely un-Niebuhrian, if not anti-Niebuhrlan. It is with good 
reason that Niebuhr fails to discuss this realm in isolation, 
for, save for the purpose of exposition, the Kingdom of Heaven 
is not to be seen or explored as if It were a segregated other­
worldly dimension of Being. The kingdom which is not of this 
world is yet in this world, through man and in man, who is in 
this world and yet not altogether of this world. True to the 
Augustlnian roots of his thought, Niebuhr consistently refuses 
to make what he considers to be the mistake of classical (Greek) 
thought which tended to a radical dualism in its treatment of 
the temporal and "divine1' orders.
A good treatment of Niebuhr’s attitude may be found in 
Chapter XIV of Beyond Tragedy. New York, 1937 > PP»273— 86, en­
titled "The Kingdom Not of This World". Whereas the reader 
might be led to expect a discussion of Niebuhr's ideal order, 
he is treated to a dissertation on how that order is relevant 
to history.
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The Kingdom of God, the kingdom of truth, is 
not of this world .... Its servants do not 
fight. They do not set power against power....
The truth is ... a revelation of the fundamental 
pattern of life which sin has obscured and which 
Christ restores. The Logos is the very pattern 
of the world .... The kingdom of truth is con­
sequently not a kingdom of some other world.
It is the picture of what this world ought to 
be .... In every moment of existence those 
’who are of the truth' hear Christ’s voice, 
warning, admonishing, guiding them in their 
actions .... The vision of God reveals their 
true centre and source of existence. 2
Two basic assertions emerge from this series of state­
ments. In the first place it is clear that in this rational 
and moral order, "power" in its political sense, has no place. 
The implications of this are mammoth, Niebuhr has just dis­
posed of the security-and-power dilemma, the will-to-power, 
the will-to-liva, and, in doing so, by definition has also 
eliminated sin and Its root, anxiety.
The initial question one supposes is, how is anxiety 
eliminated? It will be recalled that man experiences anxiety 
when, in consequence of his realization of his own finitude, 
he attempts to make himself his own end, to translate his 
finite existence into a more permanent and absolute form of 
existence —  in short, to make himself God. Thus it must be 
assumed that if anxiety is to be eliminated, man must come to 
terms with his own finitude and seek to ground his existence 
in the Eternal and Absolute Reality. Niebuhr would call this 
a transformation into the wlll-to-self-realization.
2IMd.
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Of what nature then is man. that he finds his own self 
too small to encompass the self? Surely his dimensions exceed 
the limitations of the self —  in other words, man .is self­
transcendent in his nature.
(This) ... describes the actual situation of
the self, which destroys itself by seeking it­
self too immediately. The true self dies if
the contingent self tries too desperately to 
live. 3
Logically, the next question is, how does man transcend 
himself? Niebuhr's answer is, through agape —  that sacrifi­
cial, heedless, and universal love which makes no concessions 
to any self-regarding impulses and denies any and every form 
of self-assertion, even those "natural" prudent defences of
the self which are required through the will-to-live by the
egoism of others. And man cannot even consciously aim to tran­
scend himself, for that too is self-assertive.
For the kind of self-giving which has self- 
realization as its result must not have self- 
realization as its conscious end: otherwise 
the self by calculating its enlargement will 
not escape from itself completely enough to 
be enlarged. b
This involves Niebuhr in yet another paradox. If love
is the means to self-realization yet cannot be used as such;
if love is the norm yet cannot be regarded as an obligation or
duty without defeating Itself —  in what way can one speak of
3ffalth and History, op.cit., p.17^.
^Christian Realism and Political Problems, op.cit.,
p.im.
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love as being related to man in Niebuhr's rational and moral
order? What is the relationship between duty and inclination,
or between love as commandment and the spontaneity of the
grace to love? The answer is that agape must be seen in the
form of both "love as law" and "love beyond the limits of law".
Now love implies an uncoerced giving of the 
self to the object of its devotion. It is
thus a fulfillment of the law; for in perfect
love all law is transcended and what is and 
what ought to be are one.
To command love is a paradox; for love 
cannot be commanded or demanded. To love God 
with all our hearts and all our souls and all 
our minds means that every cleavage in human 
existence is overcome. But the fact that such 
an attitude is commanded proves that the cleav­
age is not overcome; the command comes from one 
side of reality to the other, from essence to 
existence. 5
This leads directly to the second of the two basic as­
sertions contained in that description of the Heavenly City —  
an assertion that lies at the core of Niebuhr's theistic 
existentialism and permits Niebuhr ultimately to transcend the 
categories of Realism and Idealism. The Logos and all that is 
implied thereby constitute that of which the Earthly City is 
the existential form. The man of the Heavenly City is essen­
tial man.
Niebuhr describes essential man in the following man­
ner;
The essential nature of man contains two elements; 
and there are correspondingly two elements in the
^An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, op.cit.. pp.209- 
10. For a fuller discussion, see also Christian Realism and 
Political Problems, op.cit., Chapter X.
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original perfection of man. To the essential 
nature of man belong, on the one hand, all his 
natural endowments, and determinations, his 
physical and social impulses, his sexual and 
racial differentiations, in short his character 
as a creature imbedded In the natural order.
On the other hand, his essential nature also 
includes the freedom of his spirit, his tran­
scendence over natural process and finally his 
self-transcendence. 6
In thus describing the essential nature of man as finite free­
dom, Niebuhr necessarily resists any attempt to discuss man's 
essential nature in definite terms as if it were a fixed and 
static possession. This is in fact what he objects to most 
strongly in naturalism, rationalism, romanticism, and all con­
cepts of natural law; the tendency to make reference to a fixed 
and given human nature. Man is largely what he becomes; he is 
not ready-made at the outsat. There are no fixed structures 1 
of nature or reason or history which man does not transcend by 
virtue of his spiritual freedom.' Thus man stands before pos­
sibilities for action which are not calculated in terms of the 
potentialities of a fixed essential nature of any sort.
This does not mean that man in his essential form has 
become perfect in the sense of having lost his finitude. But 
he is to be distinguished from sinful existential man. It will 
be recalled that anxiety, not finitude is the root of sin, and 
it is this anxiety which prompts existential man to differ in 
the following manner: (a) man as sinner is not unmindful of 
the ultimate requirements of his nature as free spirit. He
% h e  liature and Destiny of Man. op.cit.. vol. 1, p.270.
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knows that any particular historical concretion of law is not 
enough*, (b) he is not fully conscious of the nature of these 
ultimate requirements; and (c) he is not ready to meet these 
requirements once they are defined.?
In this manner does Niebuhr relate aaane to essential 
man. Anything less rigorous must fail to captivate and ful­
fill the special dimension of freedom in man's essential nature. 
Love contains no coda or fixed form to be imposed upon human 
freedom but man's transcendent freedom is "in order to love", 
and love is ordained as the law for his life in freedom. Love
belongs therefore to the nature of essential man. From thus
defining the essence of man, Niebuhr has at once defined the 
natural norm for essential man.
The law of love is the final law for man in 
h:ls condition of finiteness and freedom because 
man in his freedom Is unable to make himself 
in his finiteness his own end. The self is 
too great to be contained within Itself in 
its smallness. 8
Thus existential man is not the source of the norm for
his essence, nor are the fixed structures of history. What
this is, is a love absolutism which expresses itself in terms 
of a universalism set against all narrower forms of human sym­
pathy. It must always provide a perspective from which all 
lesser norms pertaining to essential man can be viewed. Not 
only is it alone capable of relevance to man's finite freedom,
P.238.
°Falth and History, op.clt.. p.174-.
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but through this love of God and man, men are all perfectly 
related to each other, for all men are related in terms of 
perfect obedience and love to the centre and source of their 
existence.
The pieces now begin to fall into place. If, as Mie- L- 
buhr often suggests, moral life is at all possible only in a 
meaningful existence, Niebuhr must take steps to make it mean­
ingful. So far he has related the sacrificial ethic of the 
rational and moral order to the essential man of the same or­
der. It remains to be seen how he relates this now to exis­
tential man in history, both in terms of his individual life v 
and his collective engagements. This will Involve maintaining 
some type of tension between the empirical world and the ra­
tional ideal.
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CHAPTER V
THE DIALECTICS OF AN EXISTENTIAL SYNTHESIS
The self Is the conscious synthesis of the 
limited and the unlimited which is related to 
itself and the task of which is to become a 
self, a task which can be realized only in re­
lation to God. To become a self means to be­
come concrete. But to become concrete means 
to be neither limited nor unlimited, for that 
which must become concrete is a synthesis.
Therefore development consists in this: that 
In the eternal!zatlon of the self one escapes 
the self endlessly and in the temporalization 
of the self one endlessly returns to the self.
8GREN KIERKEGAARD, Die Krankhelt zum Tode. p.2?.
Political Realism and Political Idealism, it will be 
recalled, are terms whose applicability to any political system 
depends on the relationship in history established between the 
empirical world and a rational and moral order. Both Realist 
and Idealist must at some point make three separate statements 
concerning 1) the nature of man, politics, and society; 2) the 
nature of the Absolute and its attendant ultimate values; and 
3) the degree to which the former can approach in history any 
conceptual order derived from the latter. The definitive cri­
terion Is thus whether or not any political theory states or 
Implies that there can be progress in history toward a concrete 
embodiment of an ideal world however constructed, and that at 
some point in time, the ideal will be, in the vernacular, "ac-
83
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tualized". The Idealist says yes, whatever we wish is pos­
sible; the world is slowly progressing. The Realist says no, 
what already exists must be the limit of the possible; the 
world has not changed since Adam and will not change, save 
for the interminable redistribution of power in which empires 
wax and wane and tyranny alternates with anarchy. This is 
clearly what is meant here by the words "relationship in 
history", and as such, it is a straightforward and concise 
proposition. As a conceptual scheme it should be relevant to 
all political philosophies and in fact, is. With regard to 
Niebuhr its relevance is assured, for Niebuhr is quite explic­
it in his verdict on man’s chances for achieving the ideal 
order in history? just as explicit as he is in his verdict on 
the assertion that nothing more is possible for man in history. 
But just because it may be relevant to Niebuhr’s case, does 
not say that it can contain him.
In the first place it will soon be demonstrated that 
Niebuhr is a "bridga-builder", in the sense that the term was 
made to have previously,^ for if the posited distinction 
(Realism and Idealism) between political systems assumes that 
the relationship between the ideal and the actual is summed 
up in the question "what Is possible?", it is conceivable that 
one could avoid stating either that the ultimate is possible 
or that nothing more is possible. In the second place, it 
will be demonstrated that the definitions of Political Realism
-^See above, Chapter I, p.17.
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and Political Idealism as constructed in this thesis, for 
reasons to be outlined now, do not exclude other possibili­
ties? and then it will be shown that Niebuhr ultimately tran­
scends both categories.
Insofar as the Reaiist-Ideallst dichotomy does not 
exclude other possibilities, the key words are "relationship 
in history". As already stated, the definitions refer to the 
possibilities of a concrete embodiment in history of the ra­
tional and moral order. But here a difficulty arises —  one 
which questions exactly what is meant by the phrase "relation­
ship in history", when Interpreted literally. Is another in­
terpretation of the phrase possible? Can it be demonstrated 
that the ideal order and the empirical world of history are 
related in yet another way? Surely, to consider the relation­
ship solely in terms of the possibilities of decreasing the 
dialectical tension between the two realms, to limit oneself 
to speculation on the likelihood of a merging, is only half 
the picture. Thus, if Niebuhr can relate the two orders in 
yet another way, he will have effectively transcended the cat­
egories that this thesis has laboured to build. But before 
probing why he is neither Realist nor Idealist but something 
else again, it will be shown in what way he is both, in terms 
of the possibilities he holds out for man’s ability to proxi­
mate an ideal order in temporal history.
Niebuhr's response to the "anything is possible" thesis 
of the Idealist school and to the "nothing is possible" anti­
thesis of the Realist school, is complex, not simple. It con-
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sists of a moving dialectic rather than a series of fixed 
propositions. To maintain the proper balance between the two,
demands constant attention. Niebuhr sees man in part free and
in part bound by necessity —  to overstress man* s freedom 
leads to benign optimism; to overstress his finiteness leads 
to destructive pessimism. Each perspective must balance the 
other. Yet to cut through all this to the heart of the mat­
ter, reveals some very elegant fence-sitting.
There is no possible doubt that Niebuhr places limi­
tations on man's progress. One could cite passages from every 
book and article that he has ever written to document this 
statement; typical are the followings
The contradiction (between the ideal and the 
temporal) is recognized as a permanent element 
in man's historic situation. 2
One of the really ludicrous aspects of modern 
culture, particularly in America, is that the 
idea of the perfectibility of man is so uni­
versally accepted (Americans being the only 
unreconstructed heirs of the French Enlighten­
ment ) ... . 3
... (T)here is no point in history, whatever the 
cumulations of wisdom and power, in which the 
finiteness of man is overcome so that he could 
complete his own life, or in which history as v, 
such does not retain the ambiguity of being 
rooted in nature-necessity on the one hand 
while pointing towards transcendent, 'eternal' 
and trans-historical ends on the other hand....
Only gradually is it realized that man's ef­
forts to deny and to escape his finiteness in 
imperial ambitions and power add an element of 
corruption to the fabric of history and that
2Faith and History, op.cit.. p.197.
3pjous and Secular America, op.cit.. p.129.
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this corruption becomes a basic characteristic 
of history and a perennial problem from the 
standpoint of the fulfillment of human history 
and destiny. h-
But what does all this really mean in terms of its 
practical effects? One is constantly moved, in reading Sein­
hold Niebuhr, to question the character and scope of the lim­
its that he thinks restricts man in the attainment of the . 
ideal in history. Niebuhr seems content however, as in the 
above quotations, merely to assert that the limits do exist, 
based on the Biblical insight or revelation of his view of 
man. He may describe them as self-assertiveness, but he is 
adamant in his refusal to specify them in concrete terms, for 
to claim to know the exact limits of human perfection other 
than that the Absolute is not possible, is to claim Divine 
knowledge. Perhaps one might agree with Niebuhr that if it 
is prideful to abolish all limits, it must surely be no less 
so to claim to know them or seek to define them. Thus Niebuhr 
criticizes all natural law theories for portraying man as a 
being with a fixed and structured nature, and for compromising 
too readily with historical phenomena which man may increas­
ingly master.^
Thus Niebuhr can provide for a society which is open 
to change. He asserts that progress is always possible:
^The Nature and Destiny of Man. op.cit.. vol.II, p.1*.
?Ibid.. vol. I, p.178, 281; vol. II, p>8,55,281.
Also Christian Realism and Political Problems, op.cit., pp.3, 
200-01; An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, op.cit.. pp.H-1-6.
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It must be agreed that history means growth, 
however much the pattern of growth may be ob­
scured by the rise and fall of civilizations.6
Human freedom Is undoubtedly capable of his­
torical growth. Civilized man enjoys a degree 
of freedom which primitive man did not have.
In the same way the mature man has greater 
freedom over nature than does the child. This 
growth of freedom imparts a forward movement 
to human history. 7
The community must constantly re-examine the 
presuppositions upon which it orders its life, 
because no age can fully anticipate or predict 
the legitimate and creative vitalities which 
may arise in subsequent ages, 8
His assessment of the crisis of modern times brings out 
this qualified optimism perhaps even better. This is, he says, 
an 'hge between the ages", when "one age is dead and the other 
is powerless to be born." The age of absolute national sover­
eignty is over $ but the age of international order under po­
litical instruments, powerful enough to regulate the relations 
of nations and to compos® their competing desires, is not yet 
born. For,
... we do not know how soon and to what degree 
mankind will succeed in establishing a tolerable 
world order. Very possibly we will hover for 
some centuries between success and failure ...
fi°Ihe Mature and Destiny of Man, op.cit., vol.II,p.315.
?The Structure of Nations and Empires, op.cit.. p.288.
8The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness. 
op.cit., p.S3.
^Discerning the Sims of the Times. Hew York, 19i+6, 
ppAO-l,^
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In this manner, Niebuhr has his cake and eats it too.
He can speak of "perennial necessities" and "constant factors" 
in politics and still consider himself an historical relativ­
ist. He can criticize utopian schemes which only lead to 
frustration and disappointment, and still avoid being an ob­
scurantist or a reactionary. He can support liberal causes 
without basing that support on some mild illusion as to the 
virtue of the reform or the effects of its implementation.
The significance is that while Niebuhr can deny, on the basis 
of his assessment of man's nature, that man can ever be per­
fect, or that progress is limitless, he has succeeded in making 
those limitations meaningless in political terms. Just in the 
nick of time, the much-abused liberal creed (or at least a 
significant piece of it) has been snatched back from the brink 
of the abyss.
Yet surely the question can be asked at this points 
"progress" toward what? Does Niebuhr mean to say that there 
may be Indeterminate progress on earth toward his ideal realm - 
the Heavenly City —  wherein all men are perfectly related to 
each other in divine sacrificial love? Absolutely not. The 
fact is that not only does Niebuhr hedge his bets with regard 
to man's limitations in order to make them meaningless from the 
point of view of preventing progress, he does the same thing 
with his "best state" and its derived values.
The ideal world of the Heavenly City, characterized as 
it is by aaane is not the immediate goal toward which society 
Is progressing. It Is regarded by Niebuhr as a "final and
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absolute possibility”, which is tantamount to saying that it
will never have a social embodiment. This is not to say that
there is therefore no relationship between the two, but it is
not a question of a direct relationship under the terms of the
definitions.
It is therefore idle to assume that human 
society could ever be completely knit to­
gether by the perfection of love in which 
each carries the burdens of all, and the 
anxieties of each are quieted by the soli­
citude of all. That Is the vision of the 
Kingdom of God, of the Kingdom of perfect 
love, which hovers as a possibility and 
yet impossibility over all human life. Ac­
tually the perfect accord between each man 
and his neighbour is constantly violated 
by the inordinate concern of each for his 
own welfare. 10
The directly relevant norm, in other words, for polit­
ical decision and social policy is not lov© but justice, not 
the uncoerced self-oblation of the Kingdom of God but the kind 
of mutuality that envisages a contrived balance between the 
claims and counterclaims of contending social Interests. Thus 
the ”best state” toward which the temporal order is making pro­
gress is that to which that order is directly relevant —  an 
ideal state characterised by justice, rather than by agape.
Once again the observer is awash in a sea of dialectics. 
However, the key to understanding the matter rests in an ade­
quate grounding in the relationship between agape and justice.
In the first place, agape by definition, is an Absolute. 
Niebuhr bases all his morally normative thought on this con-
1 discerning the Signs of the Times. aPL&gAt., p.186.
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cept. In the second place, he cannot define justice simply 
because it has no basis Independent of agape (more will be 
said on this later). Justice is not a definable concept in 
Itself, for it is a relational term with Niebuhr. In the 
third place, contrary to the opinions of his reviewers, he 
does not even have a clearly articulated concept of justice 
in substantive terms. His friend and colleague, Emil Brunner, 
has said:
Brilliant as Beinhold Niebuhr is in his analysis 
of existing social conditions or of historical 
movements and cultural trends, this critical 
analysis seldom gives rise to definite, concrete 
ethical postulates for social action, ifie who ... 
often marveled at the brilliance of his analyses, 
nevertheless noted time and again this deficiency 
between criticism and construction. And the rea­
son for this Is evident: the lack of an adequate 
concept of justice .... Anyone ... who in the 
name of justice offers a critique of social is­
sues or of political policy is thereby under 
obligation not only to state what he means by 
1 justice* but also what concrete choices are de­
manded in the name of this ‘justice* he is talk­
ing about. 12
This means, in effect, that Niebuhr has to fall back 
on Aristotle —  everyone has to have his due. But this merely 
describes the spirit of justice, for the formula contains no 
indication of what each man's due Is. This is probably what 
Niebuhr admitted when he stated: "Rules of justice do not fol­
low In a 'necessary manner* from some basic proposition of
•^Gordon Harland has attempted to defend Niebuhr in 
this regard: the rest discuss Niebuhr's concept of justice as 
if this problem did not exist.
*2Bmll Brunner. "Some Remarks on Reinhold Niebuhr's 
wfork as a Christian Thinker", Kegley and Bretall, op.cit., pp.30-
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justice.”13, even though ho was wielding the argument against 
Aquinas.
What then can Niebuhr say about justice? He approaches 
this two ways. First, he compares it to agape. Then he breaks 
it down into its constituent principles, freedom and equality, 
between which a tension must be maintained.
Agaoe and justice cannot be simply Identified, for 
agane is transcendent, heedless, and sacrificial. Justice is 
historical, discriminating, and concerned with balancing in­
terests and claims.11*' But justice is never something apart 
from, or independent of, loves they exist In a dialectical re­
lationship. Love (aeaue) is both the fulfillment and negation 
of justice. Love requires justice in the sense that to be v 
•unconcerned for the achievement of a more equal justice is to 
deny the claims of love. But love negates justice for love 
transcends the calculation of more and less and does not re­
ward according to deserts. And finally, love fulfills justice 
for it provides justice with a rationale. Justice without love 
is merely a balance of power whieh cannot satisfy the special 
needs of "others’* if those needs go beyond the general rules of 
equity.
Similarly, when Niebuhr attacks justice through the 
back door, on® finds nothing but a web of relationships. One
■MlJa.i.'fes.gt p.TO.
llfNiebuhr discusses this relationship in many places, 
but possibly the best source is The Nature and Destiny of Han. 
op.cit., pp.2¥+-6 9.
UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR LIBRARY
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arrives at each man’s duo (and presumably each nation’s due), 
through the regulative principles of freedom and equality. 
Heither of these can be held as absolute 5 each threatens the 
other and the relation between them is always dialectical. 
Absolut© freedom permits the will of the stronger to prevail, 
threatening ©quality. Absolut© equality can be achieved only 
by the imposition of force, threatening freedom.
Two facts ©merge from this, after all is said and done. 
The first is that Niebuhr only knows of justice theoretically, 
in terms of its relationship to three absolutes. The second 
is that Niebuhr's ideal state characterized by agape. must also 
by definition be characterized by justice to the extent and 
only to the extent that agape requires justice (which is to say 
that the Heavenly City enjoys perfect justice but also more 
than that).
The implications are clear. The ambiguity of Niebuhr's 
concept of justice is such that one could scarcely predict on 
purely a priori grounds whether or not it is capable of attain­
ment. All that is known about it is that it hangs tensely be­
tween two poles, approaching first on® and then the other; all 
th® while bearing an unspecified dialectical relationship to a 
third pole ( M M &
This has led one author to observe*
Thus Niebuhr gives justice no substantive con­
tent whatever: justice resides purely in those 
procedures which provide men with the oppor­
tunity to unseat those in power, is/hat is left 
completely open in Niebuhr’s scheme, what has 
traditionally been left open in American poli­
tical thought, is precisely the content, raean-
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ing, and significance of human freedom. Since 
the moral ends of the state remain undefined, 
we get no positive case for some absolutely 
best regime —  but we do gat an exaltation of 
democratic constitutionalism. 15
This then is the case for the assertion that Niebuhr 
not only equivocates In his limitations of man's march forward, 
but he also equivocates when it comes to describing that as­
pect of the ideal order which man is marching forward to. In 
other words, Hlebuhr is saying that perfection in terms of the 
ultimate ideal (society structured around azane) cannot be at­
tained, but what is immediately relevant to man is a norm which 
exists in dynamic relation to the ultimate (society structured 
around justice derived from and fulfilled by agane)3 besides 
which, no one has any real notion of what this Immediately 
relevant norm consists*
If the acid test of a Realist or an Idealist as defined 
in this thesis lies in the proximity of the answer to the ques­
tion "what is possible", to one of two extremes (anything and
Kariel, In Search of Authority. New York, 196*f,
p.191.
Robert C. Good, both in his thesis (on.cit., pp. 313- 
1*0 and in his article in the Journal of Politics. "The National 
Interest and Political Realism", vol.22, I960, pp.597-619, has 
valiantly attempted to defend Niebuhr her®. Taking such state­
ments of Niebuhr's as* "The problem of justice is finally more 
important than the problem of order, but not immediately so.
The instruments of justice can function only within a frame­
work of order", Good proceeds to argue that the goal of jus­
tice in a society is always held in tension with the goal of v 
order. The results are disastrous. Not only would this mean 
that Niebuhr associates something with justice that la inimical 
to order (such as "anarchy", or "freedom" unbalanced by "equal­
ity" ), but it would mean that Niebuhr's "best state" is in fact 
a "second-best state" where insurrection is likely if it pur­
sues a policy of equal justice too strongly.
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nothing), then Niebuhr must he seen as a ',bridgebuild©^,,. He ' 
has thus contrived to remain poised between an irresponsible 
cynicism and an equally irresponsible utopianism, for while 
escaping both extremes in their characteristic illusions, he 
has been able to distil from each the richness of their in­
sights into the nature of man and history. However it should 
not be thought that this has been don® without cost. The 
price of his Idealism is such that it has robbed his Realist 
limitations of much of their content* the price of his Realism 
is such that his ethical thought attempts to hide its nudity 
in a shroud of Kantian formalism. An abstract justice bolstered 
by a transcendental agape may offer a vision of higher possi­
bilities, but it hardly provides a workable yardstick of eth­
ical discrimination.
If it is assumed as has been the case throughout this 
thesis, that the only way the ideal and empirical orders can 
be related in history is in terms of the extent to which the 
latter can realize the goals of the former, then the discussion
is ended. But Niebuhr sees yet another way in which they are '
related in history.
This relationship is a dialectical one of meaning. The 
Christian faith affirms that the same Christ who discloses the 
sovereignty of God over history is also the perfect norm of
human nature. He is the second Adam as well as the Son of
God —  existence and essence. As the incarnate revelation of 
the paradoxical relationship between Divine justice and mercy,
He discloses the ultimate mystery of the relation of the Divine
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
96
to history. This revelation clarifies the meaning of history; 
for the judgment of God preserves the distinction of good and 
evil in history, and the mercy of God finally overcomes the 
sinful corruption in which man is Involved on every level of 
moral achievement. The Kingdom of God and the Earthly City 
are related as essence to existence through Christ in history. 
To the Greeks, the Christ is foolishness because he represents 
a disclosure of the eternal in history. But to declare as 
Niebuhr does, that a disclosure of the eternal will and pur­
pose is both possible and necessary, is to accept the paradox 
of man and history in its quintessence. It is to understand 
that man is, even in the highest reaches of his transcendent 
freedom, too finite to comprehend the eternal by his own re­
sources. But it is also understood that man is, even in the 
deepest involvement of finitud© and nature, too free of nature 
to be blind to the possibilities of a disclosure of the Eternal 
which transcends him. The love which Is embodied in the Cru­
cifixion is the golden cord which establishes an ultimate re­
lationship in mystery and meaning between history and the Ab­
solute. Niebuhr has gone beyond the terms of this thesis.
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